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The Internet Immunity Escape Hatch
Gregory M. Dickinson*
Internet immunity doctrine is broken, and Congress
is helpless. Under Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996, online entities are absolutely
immune from lawsuits related to content authored by
third parties. The law has been essential to the internet’s
development over the last twenty years, but it has not kept
pace with the times and is now deeply flawed. Democrats
demand accountability for online misinformation.
Republicans decry politically motivated censorship. And
all have come together to criticize Section 230’s protection
of bad-actor websites. The law’s defects have put it at the
center of public debate, with more than two dozen bills
introduced in Congress in the last year alone.
Despite widespread agreement on basic principles,
however, legislative action is unlikely. Congress is
deadlocked, unable to overcome political polarization and
keep pace with technological change. Rather than add to
the sizeable literature proposing changes to the law, this
Article asks a different question—how to achieve
meaningful reform despite a decades-old statute and a
Congress unable to act. Even without fresh legislation,
reform is possible via an unlikely source: the Section 230
internet immunity statute that is already on the books.
Because of its extreme breadth, Section 230 grants
significant interpretive authority to the state and federal
courts charged with applying the statute. This Article
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shows how, without any change to the statute, courts
could press forward with the very reforms on which
Congress has been unable to act.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress is drowning in internet reform proposals. The
technologies that have transformed nearly every facet of human
activity—from how we work, shop, and eat, to how we debate
politics and connect with family and friends—are now dominated
by a few of the nation’s biggest tech companies, which hold the
power to track our movements, influence purchasing decisions,
regulate the flow of information, and shape political discourse.
With this great power has come great controversy. Lawmakers
from both parties are alarmed by tech companies’ unchecked
power. As private companies, they make their decisions behind
closed doors, free from public scrutiny, and yet, as online rather
than physical-world entities, they enjoy immunity from many of
the rules that govern their analog counterparts.
1436
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At the heart of the controversy lies Section 2301 of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996,2 a statute whose importance
to the modern internet is difficult to overstate. Since its enactment
more than twenty years ago, Section 230 has been a resounding
success.3 Its broad protections against lawsuits related to thirdparty content shield online entities from an economically crippling
duty to review and moderate the deluge of data that flows through
their systems.4 Without such protection, online platforms might be
compelled to censor user speech or disallow online posting
altogether to avoid the risk of liability.5 Section 230’s protections
have been crucial to the free speech advances of the last two decades.
But Section 230—as interpreted by the courts—has not kept
pace with the times and now presides over a very different internet
from the one it was designed to govern. A law designed to foster
free expression now protects entities even if they choose to silence
disfavored viewpoints. And, despite its publication-centric roots,
Section 230 now insulates online entities from liability for all
manner of lawsuits, including product-defect claims—such as the
one brought against Snapchat for the design of the app’s speed
filter,6 which resulted in many accidents by teenage drivers—and
claims involving intentional wrongdoing, like the sex-trafficking
conspiracy claim brought against the website Backpage.com by sextrafficking victims who alleged the site had hosted “escort” ads
depicting themselves and other underage girls and had
intentionally obstructed law-enforcement efforts against sex
traffickers so that it could continue to profit from the ad sales.7

1. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
2. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56,
133–43 (codified in 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 223, 303, 330, 531–32, 551, 559–61; 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1465, 2422).
3. See JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET 145–63
(2019) (discussing Section 230’s impact on the American technology industry in the years
following its enactment).
4. See infra Section I.A.
5. Id.
6. Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
7. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16–17, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 622 (2017), superseded by statute, Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex
Trafficking Act of 2017 (FOSTA), Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253, as recognized in
Teatotaller, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 242 A.3d 814, 820 (N.H. 2020).
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Every day brings fresh controversy, call for change, or
proposed legislation.8 From cyberbullying,9 online governance,10
and freedom of expression,11 to big-tech antitrust concerns,12
8. See infra Section III.B (discussing numerous reform bills pending in Congress that
would address perceived flaws in the current internet immunity regime, including volitional
online wrongdoing, special treatment of online versus offline entities, and platforms’
content-moderation practices).
9. See Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 744–45
(2016) (noting that current internet immunity doctrine bars claims against online entities for
revenge porn and other forms of cyberbullying); Andrew Gilden, Cyberbullying and the
Innocence Narrative, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 357, 389–90 (2013) (critiquing proposals to
narrow online immunity to protect gay teens from harassment on ground that such efforts
obscure the power of individual agency).
10. See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1182–93 (2018)
(discussing platforms’ role as regulators of free speech in digital era); Jennifer Daskal, Speech
Across Borders, 105 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1637–44 (2019) (discussing geographic scope of online
platforms’ content-filtering determinations and implications for territorial sovereignty); Kate
Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1599–613 (2018) (tracing the ability of private platforms like Facebook to
make content-moderation decisions regarding user-submitted content to Section 230); Frank
Pasquale, Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 309, 316–19 (2016)
(offering two possible narratives of the distributed online platform and implications for each
on regulatory and self-governance policy decisions); see also David R. Johnson & David Post,
Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) (arguing
just after Section 230’s enactment that internet regulation would require its own distinct
principles); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 501, 502 (1999) (arguing that the study of cyberlaw can illuminate principles that affect
the real world).
11. See Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship
Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1036–40 (2018) (exploring the departure of online
platforms from U.S. First Amendment values and the dangers of bowing to international
pressure to self-regulate); Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate
Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1453–84
(2011) (noting that Section 230 insulates platforms from legal liability and offering proposals
for online platforms to voluntarily respond to online hate speech); Eric Goldman, Why Section
230 Is Better Than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 33, 36–46 (2019)
(discussing Section 230’s enhanced substantive and procedural protections for online entities
beyond those of the First Amendment); Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility:
Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1009 (2008) (arguing that
Section 230 immunity should include a corresponding limit on an intermediary’s ability to
censor speech); Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 295–96 (2011) (noting speech-enhancing effects of Section 230 due
to its preventing imposition of liability on intermediaries for harmful or offensive speech
that those intermediaries might otherwise be pressured to censor).
12. See C. Scott Hemphill, Disruptive Incumbents: Platform Competition in an Age of
Machine Learning, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1974–93 (2019) (identifying potential sources of
competition among dominant participants in online platform market and offering proposals
to maximize competition); Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1037–92 (2019) (proposing bars on entities’ engaging in new lines of
business as a check on dominance of a small number of tech firms); Lina M. Khan & David
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privacy,13 and tort liability,14 the effects of internet immunity law
are as wide ranging as the internet itself.
Section 230 continues to play a critical role governing internet
liability, but its defects have put it at the center of public debate.
Reform proposals abound; more than two dozen bills were
introduced in Congress in 2020 and 2021 alone.15 The law faces
criticism from all sides, with reform efforts being led by Democrats,
Republicans, internet law scholars, and even many tech-industry
executives.16 On the fundamentals there is broad agreement:
Section 230’s core protections are essential to the modern internet
and have enabled a vibrant online world that must be preserved;
but that virtual world is also home to much wrongdoing and its
levers of power are controlled by a small number of companies that
Section 230 sometimes overprotects.17 A more tailored immunity

E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497, 527–28 (2019)
(noting Google and Facebook’s capture of the digital advertising market in the United States
and resultant effects on the traditional publishing industry).
13. See Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1952–53 (2019)
(proposing modification to Section 230 immunity to spur platforms to action to protect
against revenge porn and other invasions of sexual privacy); Bobby Chesney & Danielle
Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107
CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1755–59, 1795–804 (2019) (describing rising danger to privacy and
security posed by advances in technology for creating deep fakes and noting that Section 230
limits legal recourse against online entities that distribute such fakes).
14. See Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of Online
Harassment, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 383, 384 (2009) (tracing the rise of commercial reputation
defense services to the lack of traditional avenues of recourse to respond to online
harassment); Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805,
1836–43 (2010) (sketching the vision for a new era of privacy law and noting the barrier that
Section 230 poses to tortious enablement claims against online entities); Danielle Keats Citron
& Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just Backpage: Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L.
TECH. REV. 453, 455–56 (2018) (proposing that online immunity be narrowed to allow claims
against online entities that do not take reasonable steps to address unlawful third-party
content); Benjamin Edelman & Abbey Stemler, From the Digital to the Physical: Federal
Limitations on Regulating Online Marketplaces, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 141, 143 (2019) (noting the
bar that Section 230 poses to the regulation of modern online marketplaces); Olivier Sylvain,
Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 203, 203 (2018) (suggesting that the online
immunity doctrine be updated to consider the manner in which online entities elicit and use
their users’ data).
15. See Jess Miers, Section 230 Bill Tracker, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/
d/16nl5RZUvowt0kuzAgd-7QF136jd1XvwYQ_IL6Cwk-QY (last visited Mar. 4, 2022)
(tracking spreadsheet of proposed Section 230 amendments run by Jess Miers of
jessmiers.medium.com).
16. See infra Section II.A.
17. See infra Sections I.B–II.A.
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doctrine would be an improvement if it could be implemented
without undermining the statute’s other objectives.
Despite widespread agreement on basic principles, however,
action from Congress is unlikely. New proposals crop up here,
there, and everywhere, but none has been able to muster the
support of a congressional majority. Deadlock on internet
immunity is attributable to multiple factors. Most visible18 is the
two parties’ focus on different aspects of the problem. Democrats
prioritize protecting the public from harmful content such as
falsified political ads, hate speech, and materials promoting
terrorism, whereas Republicans prioritize correction of perceived
political bias, alleging that platforms’ content-censorship practices
systematically silence conservative voices. Political polarization
compounds the problem.19 Even where the parties’ concerns are
compatible, compromise has been difficult because “free speech”
and “online content moderation” have been deployed as partisan
rallying cries rather than dually desirable policy goals.
Rather than add to the sizeable (and growing) body of literature
proposing changes to Section 230, this Article tackles a different
problem—how to achieve meaningful reform despite a decades-old
internet immunity statute and a Congress unable to act. This Article
shows how, even without fresh legislation from Congress,
significant reform is possible via an unlikely source: the Section 230
internet immunity statute that is already on the books.20 Although
decades of judicial precedent have cemented in place an expansive
interpretation of internet immunity that lacks the nuance to govern
the modern virtual world, Section 230’s sparse language—a mere
twenty-six words—also contains the seeds for reform. An
interpreter with a fresh slate could read the same statutory
language to produce very different results. This Article shows how
Section 230’s linguistic indeterminacy opens an alternative path
to reform. Judicial elaboration by state and federal courts21 could
reinterpret Section 230, without any change to the statutory
language, to address the very problems that have been the focus of
18. Other reasons include the rapid pace of change in internet technology; the
difficulty of drafting legislation in the abstract for future, unseen technologies; and
Congress’s limited competence, as a majority-ruled body of nonexperts, to move quickly to
address technological change. See infra Sections II.B, III.A.
19. See infra Section II.B.1.
20. See infra Sections III.B–C.
21. See infra Sections III.B–C.
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reform proposals: online wrongdoing, disparate treatment of
online versus offline entities, content-moderation practices, and
perceived censorship bias.
This Article approaches the problem in three parts. Part I begins
with an overview of Section 230’s design and continued importance
before moving on to discuss the ways that Section 230, as currently
interpreted, is insufficiently nuanced to govern the modern
internet. Part II surveys proposed legislation and examines why
Congress has been unable to act despite wide agreement regarding
the dangers of overextending Section 230 immunity and the
importance of preserving free expression. Finally, Part III proposes
judicial elaboration of Section 230’s sparse textual provisions to
overcome congressional gridlock and achieve significant reform.
I. THE INTERNET’S AGING PROGENITOR
Section 230’s importance to the modern internet is hard to
overstate. The federalization of internet law and elimination of any
obligation on online entities to moderate third-party content helped
to fuel the internet’s explosive growth from the 1990s through the
2000s, and its protections are critical to the internet’s continued
success in the decades to come. But the statute is starting to show
its age. Although free expression and a robust online economy
remain as important as ever, Section 230, and the tech industry it
protects, has faced withering criticism for interfering with other
private and governmental interests. Prominent members of both
parties are now calling for reform, criticizing Section 230 and the
entities it protects for failing to stop election interference and other
public disinformation campaigns, censoring conservative political
voices, and preventing victims of online harms from seeking redress.
This Part begins with an overview of Section 230’s design and
continued importance before moving on to discuss the ways in
which Section 230, as currently interpreted, is a poor fit for the
modern internet.
A. The Law that Created the Internet
Section 230 immunizes online entities against lawsuits related
to content created by their users or other third parties.22 The law
22. Importantly, although it bars most civil claims, Section 230 does not prevent
criminal prosecution and expressly excludes from its protection any claims “pertaining to
intellectual property.” See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).
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promotes “decency” on the internet by allowing online entities to
censor “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable” content without fear of
being “treated as the publisher or speaker” of—and held liable—
for whatever content they fail to censor.23 The law promotes
freedom of expression by guaranteeing online entities’ ability to
receive and transmit the massive volume of information that flows
into their systems without fearing liability based on the nature of
its contents. By protecting online entities against liability for
hosting or relaying content, the statute has supported the internet’s
growth in two related ways.
First, Section 230 shields online entities like Facebook or Twitter
from an economically crippling duty to moderate the content
flowing through their systems. Requiring such entities to review
the millions of daily posts and remove unlawful material would
impose an insurmountable logistical and financial burden and
undermine the internet as we know it.24 By immunizing online
entities against lawsuits related to third-party content, Section 230
ensures that the costs of moderating user-created content do not
stifle the growth of internet platforms.
Second, and relatedly, Section 230 protects against collateral
censorship of users’ speech. Were online entities at risk of legal
liability whenever one of their users posted something unlawful,
platforms might decide to block their users from posting even
slightly risky material, to avoid the cost of moderating content and
the risk of legal liability for failing to do so.25 Why risk posting
content that could subject the company to liability, when the
platform, unlike the speaker herself, has no intrinsic interest in
publicizing the message? Most likely to engage in widespread
censorship would be platforms like Twitter, which transmit so
much content that they could not possibly hope to screen it all. But
the incentive to censor would press even low-volume sites, like
individual blogs, whose operators typically lack the resources of

23. See id. § 230(c).
24. See Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 101, 101–02 (2007) (noting the billions of web pages indexed by Google’s search
engine and observing that if it or other “Internet intermediaries were liable every time
someone posted problematic content on the Internet, the resulting threat of liability and
effort at rights clearance would debilitate the Internet”).
25. Wu, supra note 11, at 298–300.
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larger entities to respond to problematic material.26 Without Section
230’s protections, the legal risks of hosting user-created content
would push entities of all sizes to dramatically alter their current
practices. Platforms might require that users’ posts be manually
prescreened before becoming visible to the public; they might
adopt automated censorship tools calibrated to let through only the
most benign speech; or they might decide to eliminate user-created
content from their sites altogether by removing comment-posting
functionality. The result would be the elimination of decades of free
speech advances built on inexpensive and free flowing internet
publishing technologies.27
B. Section 230 Shows Its Age
But the venerable statute now shows its age. The Congress of
1996 did not foresee the internet of today, and Section 230 now
presides over a very different internet from the one it was designed
to govern. Section 230 assumes a publication-industry-like model
of the internet. It encourages censorship, speaks in terms of
“publishers or speakers” and “content providers,”28 and is well
suited to govern the internet’s information repositories and
communications channels—modern analogues to the publication
world, like Facebook, Twitter, and Netflix. But publication has
never been the internet’s exclusive function, and it is even less so
now than it was in 1996. Internet entities of today are much larger,
diverse, and interactive and serve as platforms to support the
delivery of innumerable real-world goods and services that would
have been unimaginable twenty years ago. Authoring or failing to
moderate content flowing through their services is not the only way
that online entities can cause harm, and Section 230’s bright-line
rule relying on content authorship as the deciding factor for
immunity is poorly tailored to the internet that exists today.
26. See id. at 301 (reasoning that the collateral censorship problem extends to both lowand high-volume intermediaries and that some of the highest value speech, like corporate
whistleblowing, is risky for intermediaries and the most likely to be censored).
27. See id. at 298–99 (observing that pre-internet speech was “limited to those who
were able to get past the old gatekeepers—newspapers, book publishers, retailers, and the
like” but that “[n]ow all that is needed is an Internet connection.”); see also Eugene Volokh,
Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1806–07 (1995) (noting that historically,
the right to free speech has favored popular or well-funded ideas, but predicting, presciently,
that new information technologies would dramatically reduce the costs of distributing
speech and create a more diverse and democratic environment).
28. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
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Critics of Section 230 point to four main problem areas. First,
Section 230 includes no scienter-based limitation on immunity. An
online entity is eligible for immunity even if it is aware of or even
intends to cause the harms that result from its platform.29 The
statute was, for example, famously invoked to bar a sex-trafficking
conspiracy claim asserted against the website Backpage.com by
plaintiffs who alleged the site hosted “escort” ads of underage girls
and intentionally obstructed law-enforcement efforts against sex
traffickers so that it could continue to profit from the ad sales.30 It
has similarly protected online entities against claims for knowingly
facilitating illegal gun sales,31 distributing child pornography,32 and
other unlawful conduct, on the ground that, under Section 230,
online entities are immune from claims related to third-parties’ use
of their platforms, regardless of knowledge or intent.
Second, Section 230 creates a disparity in the law’s treatment of
online versus offline entities in nonpublication contexts, such as
product-defect claims and actions against online marketplaces. In
such contexts, Section 230’s content-authorship-based test for
immunity is problematic because, although the plaintiff’s injury
may be causally connected with third-party-created content, the
defendant’s alleged wrongdoing often is not a failure by the
defendant, as a publisher, to moderate that content. Applying
Section 230 to nonpublication claims, courts have, for example,
29. See id. § 230(c)(1); see also, e.g., Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710, 726 (Wis.
2019) (explaining that the plaintiff’s allegation that Armslist knew its website was used for
illegal gun sales “does not change the result” because Section 230 “contains no good faith
requirement” and “courts do not allow allegations of intent or knowledge to defeat a motion
to dismiss”).
30. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
622 (2017), superseded by statute, Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act
of 2017 (FOSTA), Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253, as recognized in Teatotaller, LLC v.
Facebook, Inc., 242 A.3d 814, 820 (N.H. 2020). Whether criminal enforcement and Congress’s
later amendment of Section 230 to permit civil claims benefited sex workers is an open
question. Some fear that criminalization and other legal barriers to sex work may harm sex
workers by forcing them to work in secret, more dangerous environments. See Anna North,
Sex Workers Are in Danger. Warren and Sanders Are Backing a Bill That Could Help, VOX (Dec.
17, 2019, 12:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/12/17/21024859/sex-workbernie-sanders-elizabeth-warren-fosta.
31. See Daniel, 926 N.W.2d at 714, 716 (barring negligence, public nuisance, wrongful
death, aiding and abetting tortious conduct, and other claims against Armslist, alleging that
it intentionally designed its website to facilitate illegal gun sales).
32. See Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1011–12, 1018 (Fla. 2001) (finding
Section 230 to bar action against AOL for violating Florida statutes prohibiting distribution
of child pornography despite allegation that AOL was aware that a particular user of its
service was transmitting unlawful photographs and yet declined to intervene).
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dismissed product-defect claims against Grindr33 and Snapchat34
for failing to incorporate safety features into their apps, and unfair
competition claims against Facebook35 and Google36 for making
false claims about their products or failing to abide by their stated
terms of service.
Third, Section 230 enables online platforms to freely
disseminate harmful or offensive material. The statute eliminates
any duty on Facebook, Twitter, and other internet entities to review
or censor content created by their users, regardless of how harmful
dissemination of that content may be to society. Online platforms
have come under increasing criticism for the harmful content that
they host, including election misinformation,37 hate speech,38

33. Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 584, 590–91 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 765
F. App’x 586 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding dating app immune under Section 230 despite inclusion
of geolocation function and lack of safety features which allowed user’s ex-boyfriend to
harass him).
34. Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2020), rev’d and remanded,
995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021) (discussing a negligence claim against Snapchat for alleged
defects in design of the speed filter feature of its app, which plaintiff alleged contributed to
auto accidents).
35. Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 700 F. App’x 588, 590 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming
dismissal of unfair competition claim alleging Facebook violated its own terms of service to
plaintiff’s detriment by failing to block obscene videos of plaintiff posted to the service by an
unknown person).
36. Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1265–66, 1272 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of the Lanham Act false advertising claims of locksmith
companies which alleged that Google and other online advertising platforms had “conspired
to ‘flood the market’ of online search results with information about so-called ‘scam’
locksmiths, in order to extract additional advertising revenue” from truly local locksmiths).
37. See Kevin Roose, Reviewing Misinformation: What Reporters and Readers Found, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2018, at A16 (discussing numerous examples of election misinformation
spread on Facebook, Twitter, and other platforms).
38. See Mike Isaac, Facebook Lets Hate Flourish, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2020, at
A1 (detailing findings of report from internal audit commissioned by Facebook that faulted
it for endangering civil rights by allowing hateful and violent speech on its platform);
Daisuke Wakabayashi, Why Hate Speech on the Internet Is a Never-Ending Problem, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2019, at B1 (discussing the issue of hate speech on internet platforms and proposals
to reform Section 230).
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revenge porn,39 and false information about COVID-19.40 They
have also faced criticism for platform-design and contentmoderation decisions that have enabled cyber stalking, cyber
bullying,41 and facilitated terrorism-related activity in violation of
civil antiterrorism laws.42 Because, under Section 230, a platform
has no legal obligation to review user content, any moderation
decision is at its discretion and immune from legal challenge.
Fourth, and relatedly, Section 230 insulates online platforms
from legal challenges even if their content-moderation policies are
politically biased or disfavor marginalized voices. Some critics
perceive systematic biases in the way that platforms’ contentmoderation policies select users’ posts for promotion, demotion, or
censorship.43 Most prominently, many conservatives criticized
Twitter and Facebook for their decisions to disable former

39. See Erica Goode, Once Scorned, but on Revenge Sites, Twice Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2013, at A11 (discussing the problem of revenge porn and efforts to criminalize it); see also
People v. Austin, 2019 IL 123910 (2019), cert. denied sub nom. Austin v. Illinois, No. 19-1029,
2020 WL 5882221 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2020) (upholding Illinois revenge porn law as not improperly
restricting freedom of speech). See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks,
Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014) (describing the problem of
nonconsensual distribution of private sexual images and arguing for the criminalization of
revenge porn).
40. See Mike Isaac, Facebook to Remove Vaccine Misinformation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2020,
at A9 (discussing Facebook’s voluntary shift to begin removing misinformation about
COVID-19 after facing criticism for false information distributed through its platform).
41. See Maeve Duggan, Online Harassment 2017, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 11, 2017),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/07/11/online-harassment-2017/ (poll finding 41%
of Americans to have been subjected to harassing behavior online); Jessica M. Goldstein, Reeling
from ‘Revenge Porn’, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2020, at C1 (discussing domestic abusers’ threats of
disclosing intimate images to control partners); see also Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306
F. Supp. 3d 579, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 765 F. App’x 586 (2d Cir. 2019) (describing
harassment of former romantic partner via Grindr app).
42. See Tony Romm, Rachel Lerman, Cat Zakrzewski, Heather Kelly & Elizabeth
Dwoskin, Lawmakers Clash with Silicon Valley CEOs on Liability, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2020, at
A21 (discussing Senate questioning of tech company leaders regarding their contentmoderation practices for content including terrorist propaganda); see also Force v. Facebook,
Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 68–72 (2d Cir. 2019) (rejecting claim alleging platform’s material support of
terrorism); Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1118 (N.D Cal. 2016) (dismissing case
pursuant to Section 230 suit alleging Twitter knowingly provided material support to
terrorist group), aff’d on other grounds, 881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2018).
43. See Kate Conger & Davey Alba, Admirers Follow President into Battle with Twitter,
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2020, at B1 (describing conservatives’ criticism of Twitter for adding
critical fact-check labels to tweets of President Trump); Tony Romm, Trump Considers ‘Legal
Steps’ Against Social Media Sites, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2020, at A20 (discussing proposal by
President Trump to reform Section 230 in response to perceived political bias of
online platforms).
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President Trump’s media accounts44 and to restrict access to a series
of stories published by the New York Post about President Joe
Biden’s son, Hunter.45 Google and other content aggregators have
faced similar criticism of algorithmic bias against the poor, women,
and racial and other minorities because the algorithms they rely on
to curate and analyze online content may perpetuate social
stereotypes and inequalities.46 As online communication has
become the preferred format for political discourse, those who feel
excluded from the conversation have little recourse.
*

*

*

The internet has changed since Section 230 was enacted in 1996.
The tech world is much broader and more mature. And internet
speech is now controlled by a small number of key players who, as
private entities, moderate content at their discretion, free from
public scrutiny. Yet, as online rather than physical-world entities,
they enjoy a preferred legal status under Section 230 that insulates
their decisions from legal challenge.47
II. ACADEMIC BORBORYGMI48 AND CONGRESSIONAL DEADLOCK
Although Section 230 continues to play a critical role governing
internet liability, its defects have put it at the center of public debate

44. See Kevin Roose, Megaphone to Masses Goes Silent, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2021, at B1
(discussing Twitter’s and Facebook’s decisions to disable the President’s accounts after the
attack on the U.S. Capitol).
45. See Kevin Roose, Eyes on 2016, Social Media Tackles 2020, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2020,
at A1 (recounting the incident and observing that such incidents put social media companies
“in a precarious spot” because they “are criticized when they allow misinformation to
spread” and also “when they try to prevent it”).
46. See Farhad Manjoo, Search Bias, Blind Spots and Google, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2018,
at B1 (recounting examples of algorithmic bias, such as Google’s spelling correction of the
search “English major who taught herself calculus” to “taught himself calculus”).
47. See generally Klonick, supra note 10 (detailing the pivotal role online entities play
in controlling public discourse and their processes for content-moderation decision making);
see also Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 700 F. App’x 588, 590 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal
under Section 230 of unfair competition claim alleging Facebook violated its own terms of
service to plaintiff’s detriment by failing to block obscene videos of plaintiff posted to
the service).
48. “Borborygmi” is a fancy-pants word I once heard a physician use to describe
stomach gurgles. Despite my gut intuition, the word appears, somewhat disappointingly,
not to be onomatopoeic. See Borborygmi, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2003) (defining the word as “intestinal rumbling caused by moving gas” and tracing its
etymology to the Greek borboryzein, meaning “to rumble”). It seems an apt descriptor for
legal scholars’ ruminations.
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over internet policy. The law faces critics on all sides, with calls for
reform coming from leading Democrats, Republicans, internet law
scholars, and even tech-industry executives.49 Some urge complete
repeal;50 others suggest targeted amendments;51 and still others
argue that its defects are overblown, that changes are likely to do
more harm than good, and that the statute should be left as is.52
Even for those who think Section 230 should be changed, however,
there is little agreement on particular legislative or regulatory changes.
This Part summarizes numerous recent proposals to reform
Section 230, many of which are currently pending before Congress,
and explores why, despite broad support for change, Congress has
been unable to act.
A. Proposals for Section 230 Reform
One collection of proposals would amend Section 230 to curtail
immunity for online entities that intentionally facilitate unlawful
conduct. For example, a Department of Justice review of Section 230
concluded that a “Bad Samaritan” carve out53 should be added to
49. See Dave McCabe, Tech Giants Shift Posture on Legal Shield, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2020,
at B1 (discussing reform pressure from political leaders and shift by Facebook, Twitter, Snap,
and others to support modifications to Section 230).
50. Though their reasons differ, both President Biden and former President Trump
have voiced support for complete repeal of Section 230. See John D. McKinnon & Ryan Tracy,
Where Trump and Biden Stand on Big Tech; Both See Problems, but Differ on Solutions, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 17, 2020, at A4 (“Mr. Biden surprised the tech world when he called for revoking
Section 230. But unlike conservatives, Mr. Biden says some social-media platforms do too
little policing, not too much.”).
51. See infra Section II.A; see also Gregory M. Dickinson, Rebooting Internet Immunity,
89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 381–85 (2021) (surveying recent proposed reforms to Section 230
and assessing risks and limitations of those reforms).
52. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 11, at 36-46 (arguing that Section 230’s enhanced
substantive and procedural protections for online entities beyond those of the First
Amendment counsel against reform); Riana Pfefferkorn, House Introduces EARN IT Act
Companion Bill, Somehow Manages to Make It Even Worse, THE CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Oct.
5,
2020),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2020/10/house-introduces-earn-it-actcompanion-bill-somehow-manages-make-it-even-worse (discussing proposed legislation to
reduce scope of Section 230 immunity).
53. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SECTION 230—NURTURING INNOVATION OR FOSTERING
UNACCOUNTABILITY? 3, 14–15 (2020), available at
https://www.justice.gov/file/1286331/download
[hereinafter
DOJ SECTION 230
RECOMMENDATIONS]. In recommending a Bad Samaritan carve out, the DOJ referenced
Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710 (Wis. 2019), noting that, in that case, the website
that facilitated the sale of a firearm to a prohibited person “was immune under Section 230,
despite allegations that [the] website was intentionally designed with the specific purpose of
skirting federal firearm laws.” DOJ SECTION 230 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at 14.
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the statute to ensure that online entities that purposefully solicit
“third parties to sell illegal drugs to minors, exchange child sexual
abuse material,” or engage in other unlawful activities through
their platforms “do not benefit from Section 230’s sweeping
immunity at the expense of their victims.”54 A host of proposed
amendments introduced in Congress in 2020 would strip immunity
from online entities that facilitate such behavior.55 Academic
commentators have offered their own solutions, such as limiting
immunity to claims that impose a content-moderation burden on
defendants,56 applying joint enterprise liability theory to allow
claims against entities that intentionally profit from their users’
misconduct,57 and imposing a reasonableness requirement that
would require online entities to take reasonable steps to prevent
misuse of their services to qualify for immunity.58 These and other
similar proposals are all motivated by the perceived overprotection
of online entities under Section 230, but they differ in the types of
misconduct they target and the enforcement mechanisms
they employ.
Another set of proposals seeks to combat online dissemination
of harmful and offensive material, such as political misinformation,
hate speech, child pornography, and posts promoting violent
extremism. These proposals would spur online platforms to police
54. DOJ SECTION 230 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 53, at 14.
55. See, e.g., Eliminating Abusive and Rampant Neglect of Interactive Technologies
Act of 2020 (EARN IT Act), S. 3398, 116th Cong. (2020) (allowing civil suits against companies
that recklessly distribute child pornography); See Something, Say Something Online Act of
2020, S. 4758, 116th Cong. (2020) (requiring online entities to report to the federal government
criminal activity on their platforms of which they are aware or reasonably should have been
aware and stripping Section 230 immunity where an entity fails to do so).
56. See Dickinson, supra note 51, at 390–95.
57. See Agnieszka McPeak, Platform Immunity Redefined, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1557
(2021); see also Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 203, 276–77 (2018)
(suggesting online immunity doctrine should consider entities’ intentional solicitation and
sale or use of user data).
58. See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying
Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 419 (2017); see also Citron &
Wittes, supra note 14, at 455–56 (arguing immunity should be limited to online entities that,
when warned, take reasonable steps to protect against illegal activity); Benjamin Edelman &
Abbey Stemler, From the Digital to the Physical: Federal Limitations on Regulating Online
Marketplaces, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 141, 193 (2019) (contending immunity should be denied,
among other times, when entities were on actual notice of a specific pattern or problem);
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 335 (2005)
(arguing no immunity where an entity has actual notice of ongoing unlawful activity);
Tushnet, supra note 11, at 1010 (holding immunity could be denied where an entity refuses
to remove content if the original speaker has conceded liability).
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content on their platforms by withholding Section 230’s protections
unless they bar certain types of speech and activity. For example,
the Protecting Americans from Dangerous Algorithms Act would
withhold immunity from online platforms whose algorithms
amplify content related to international terrorism and certain civil
rights violations.59 Similarly, the Holding Sexual Predators and
Online Enablers Accountable Act would exclude from immunity
online platforms that recklessly facilitate or host content depicting
child sexual exploitation.60 Many other proposals take this same
basic form: Repeal or narrow Section 230 immunity to drive online
platforms to adopt more stringent content-moderation policies.61
Finally, a third set of proposals attacks the opposite problem—
platforms’ perceived censorship or marginalization of particular
groups and individuals, especially political conservatives and
racial minorities. These proposals would reduce or eliminate online
entities’ discretion to selectively bar or promote certain speech from
their platforms. For example, the Protecting Constitutional Rights
from Online Platform Censorship Act would combat contentmoderation bias by amending Section 230 to create a private right
of action against any online platform that removes or restricts
access to content protected by the First Amendment.62 Similarly, the
Biased Algorithm Deterrence Act would target platforms’
promotion and demotion of select user content by withholding
Section 230 immunity for claims against online entities that stem
from user-created content that the entity reordered to appear other
than as chronologically posted.63 Although the proposals in this
group differ dramatically in their particulars, all attempt to curb
content-moderation practices that may interfere with the free
expression of disfavored groups.64
59. See Protecting Americans from Dangerous Algorithms Act, H.R. 8636, 116th Cong. (2020).
60. See Holding Sexual Predators and Online Enablers Accountable Act of 2020, S.
5012, 116th Cong. (2020).
61. See, e.g., Curbing Abuse and Saving Expression in Technology Act (CASE-IT Act),
H.R. 285, 117th Cong. (2021) (among other things, withholding immunity for entities that
knowingly facilitate distribution of obscene content to minors); Cecilia Kang, David McCabe
& Jack Nicas, For Tech, Not Much to Celebrate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2020, at B1 (noting that
President Biden’s “clearest position on internet policy” has been to revoke Section 230, which
protects tech companies “from lawsuits for hosting or removing harmful or misleading content”).
62. See Protecting Constitutional Rights from Online Platform Censorship Act, H.R.
83, 117th Cong. (2021).
63. See Biased Algorithm Deterrence Act of 2019, H.R. 492, 116th Cong. (2020).
64. See, e.g., Limiting Section 230 Immunity to Good Samaritans Act, H.R. 8596, 116th
Cong. (2020) (requiring platforms to adhere to stated terms of service regarding content-
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B. Hyperactive Inaction in Congress
Despite a tsunami of proposed legislation and widespread
support for change, Congress is at a standstill. On the
fundamentals, there is broad agreement: (1) Section 230’s
protections have been essential to the creation of the modern
internet; (2) online platforms enable a new form of democratic selfexpression that must be preserved; but (3) the virtual world has also
come to harbor or even foster all variety of human wrongdoing;
and (4) when Section 230 impedes legal action against such
wrongdoing, it is at best a necessary evil. Put differently, Section
230 must be preserved insofar as it protects a critical medium of
expression. Nobody wants to go back to the dark ages of the 1980s
by allowing platforms to be sued out of existence or forced to curtail
user speech. But Section 230’s broad immunity provisions
sometimes protect bad actors along with the good, and a more
tailored immunity doctrine would be an improvement if it could be
implemented without undermining the statute’s objectives.
Widespread agreement on basic principles, even at this high level
of generality, would often produce a legislative solution—uniting
legislators around those goals most central to a governing majority.
Indeed, that is exactly what happened in 2018 when Congress
amended Section 230 by enacting the Allow States and Victims to
Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA).65 So troubled was
Congress by the First Circuit’s dismissal of a sex trafficking
conspiracy claim against the website Backpage.com66 that, despite
moderation practices to qualify for immunity); Online Freedom and Viewpoint Diversity
Act, S. 4534, 116th Cong. (2020) (eliminating immunity where a platform editorializes or
modifies third-party content); Stopping Big Tech’s Censorship Act, S. 4062, 116th Cong.
(2020) (removing immunity for entities that limit access to “constitutionally protected
material”); Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2020)
(requiring politically neutral content-moderation practices to qualify for immunity);
Abandoning Online Censorship (AOC) Act, H.R. 8896, 116th Cong. (2020) (repealing Section
230 “to stop censorship, and for other purposes”); Protect Speech Act, H.R. 8517, 116th Cong.
(2020) (requiring platforms to publish and adhere to terms of service governing contentmoderation practices to qualify for Section 230 protection); Stop the Censorship Act of 2020,
H.R. 7808, 116th Cong. (2020) (replaces with “unlawful” the vague “otherwise objectionable”
category of content removal that qualifies for Section 230(c)(2) “Good Samaritan immunity”).
65. See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L.
No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018).
66. See Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
622 (2017), superseded by statute, Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act
(FOSTA), Pub. L. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253, as recognized in Teatotaller, LLC v. Facebook, Inc.,
242 A.3d 814, 820 (N.H. 2020).
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great respect for Section 230’s speech-protecting function,
overwhelming majorities in the House and Senate revised Section
230 to specifically exclude sex trafficking claims.67 Since 2018,
however, no additional legislative action appears likely, even
though Congress and academic commentators widely
acknowledge both the dangers of overextending immunity and the
importance of preserving free expression online.
1. Political Polarization
Congressional deadlock on internet immunity is attributable to
multiple factors. Most visibly, the two parties focus on different
aspects of the problem. Democrats criticize online platforms’ failure
to protect the public from harmful content such as falsified political
ads, hate speech, and materials promoting terrorism,68 whereas
Republicans focus on perceived political bias, alleging that
platforms’ content censorship practices systematically silence
conservative voices.69 To some extent, these concerns are
irreconcilable: Republicans can hardly be expected to consent to the
targeting of conservative speech, nor Democrats to election
interference and the incitement of violence. But political
polarization compounds the problem. A shrinking moderate center
in Congress leaves fewer members likely to cross the aisle to craft
bipartisan legislation.70 And to the similarly polarized public that
67. See, e.g., 163 CONG. REC. S4671 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2017) (statement of Sen. Portman,
R-Ohio, speaking on behalf of bipartisan group of senators introducing the bill that would
become FOSTA) (“I believe that we need to have free internet. All of us do. I believe that the
Communications Decency Act is a well-intentioned law that has an important purpose. But
the law was not intended to protect those who willingly facilitate illegal conduct . . . .”); 164
CONG. REC. H1278 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2018) (statement of Rep. Wagner, R-Missouri)
(describing FOSTA as “in many ways just a simple statement of the obvious: Congress does
not believe—and did not ever believe—that rape was a perquisite [sic] of a free and open
internet”); 164 CONG. REC. S1852 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2018) (statement of Sen. Heitkamp, DNorth Dakota) (“This was not easy. No one should think that this came together easily or
that we didn’t have many moments where we did our own soul-searching, those of us who
are committed to the First Amendment and those of us who are committed to free access of
means to express our opinions and do our business.”).
68. See Tony Romm & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Silicon Valley Braces for Regulatory Change,
WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2021, at A1 (discussing Democrats’ and President Biden’s efforts to press
online platforms to censor online content).
69. See Tony Romm, GOP Votes to Subpoena Facebook, Twitter CEOs, WASH. POST, Oct.
23, 2020, at A16 (discussing the Republicans’ “campaign to rethink Section 230” “in response
to concerns about political bias”).
70. See Michael S. Kang, Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1379, 1419 (2020)
(surveying recent political science literature on political polarization and attributing that
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make up their representatives’ constituencies, cooperation and
compromise would be defeat.71 Even where the parties’ concerns
are compatible, compromise is challenging because “free speech”
and “online content moderation” have become partisan rallying
cries rather than dually desirable policy objectives.72
2. Congress and Technological Change
Congress’s inaction is also, in part, a natural response to the
difficulty of crafting legislation to govern a rapidly evolving field.
For decades, Congress has struggled to keep pace with the
constantly changing technological landscape, from automobiles
and nuclear power plants to the internet and smartphones.73 The
public exerts continual pressure to respond to headlines, which
limits Congress’s capacity to develop detailed, long-term
legislative solutions.74 And even when it has the time and political
support to do so, members of Congress often lack the expertise75 to
polarization in part to political gerrymandering that produces fewer contested districts
and moderates).
71. See generally David E. Pozen, Eric L. Talley & Julian Nyarko, A Computational
Analysis of Constitutional Polarization, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2019); Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos, The Dance of Partisanship and Districting, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 507
(2019); Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 276 (2011).
72. See Emily A. Vogels, Andrew Perrin & Monica Anderson, Most Americans Think
Social Media Sites Censor Political Viewpoints, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 19, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2020/08/19/most-americans-think-social-mediasites-censor-political-viewpoints (finding 90% of Republicans and 59% of Democrats believe
it is likely that social media sites intentionally censor political viewpoints they disfavor and
that 71% of Republicans compared to 25% of Democrats disapprove of social media sites
labeling posts from elected officials as misleading or inaccurate).
73. See generally Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 1 (2014); Wulf A. Kaal & Robert N. Farris, Innovation and Legislation: The Changing
Relationship—Evidence from 1984 to 2015, 58 JURIMETRICS J. 303, 304 (2018); Albert C. Lin,
Revamping Our Approach to Emerging Technologies, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1309 (2011).
74. See Lin, supra note 73, at 1327.
75. Recognizing its own shortcoming, Congress in 1972 established the Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) to “equip [the legislative branch] with new and effective
means for securing competent, unbiased information concerning the physical, biological,
economic, social, and political effects of [technology]” and to use such information to provide
“legislative assessment of matters pending before the Congress.” Technology Assessment
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-484, § 2, 86 Stat. 797 (1972) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 471–81).
Congress abolished the OTA in 1995 by cutting off its funding. It may be time to reconsider
that decision. See Kevin Kosar, Congress’s Tech Policy Knowledge Gap, CATO UNBOUND (June
10,
2019),
https://www.cato-unbound.org/2019/06/10/kevin-kosar/congresss-techpolicy-knowledge-gap (discussing the OTA’s purpose and advocating for its revival); Patrick
Healy & Cornelia Dean, Clinton Says She Would Shield Science from Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
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understand and regulate complex technological issues and are
likely to be heavily influenced by industry lobbyists and other
beneficiaries of the status quo.76
These pressures can be seen in Congress’s relationship with
Section 230. Spurred to action in 1995 by the concern of the moment,
internet pornography, Congress enacted the Communications
Decency Act to limit children’s access to online pornography by
making it unlawful for entities to knowingly make “indecent”
material available to minors.77 Tacked on to this much more
comprehensive Act78 was Section 230, which supported the CDA’s
goal to protect the nation’s children from pornography by ensuring
that online entities would not risk incurring legal liability for any
steps they might take to filter indecent material.79 The provision
underwent little analysis, deliberative process, or public debate, for
Section 230 regulated an internet industry then so small that it
attracted no significant attention.80 Instead, Section 230 was crafted
by a small group “flying by the seats of [their] pants”81 and slipped
through the legislative process virtually unnoticed.
After the internet-pornography emergency that brought
Section 230 to life, congressional and public interest waned. It was
not until 2018 that Congress revisited the statute. That year, as
discussed previously, Congress responded to a new controversy—
online sex trafficking on the Backpage.com website—by enacting
FOSTA, which narrowly amended Section 230’s immunity
provisions82 so that it could not be invoked as a defense to civil sex

2007, at A22 (reporting then-Senator and Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s
call in 2007 for Congress to revive the OTA).
76. See Lin, supra note 73, at 1327–28. The advent of the internet age has placed even
more pressure on legislative structures, perhaps outpacing regulatory capacity. Since 1998,
the pace of innovation has accelerated and diverged from its historically parallel relationship
with legislative and regulatory expansion. See Kaal & Farris, supra note 73, at 305.
77. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(relevant provisions codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223), declared unconstitutional as to indecent
material, Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 883 (1997); see also KOSSEFF, supra
note 3, at 61–63.
78. Few media outlets included any discussion of Section 230 in their coverage of the
CDA. See KOSSEFF, supra note 3, at 66–68 (recounting the history of Section 230’s enactment).
79. See 47 U.S.C. § 230; supra Section I.A.
80. See KOSSEFF, supra note 3, at 67–71.
81. See id. at 66.
82. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1), which FOSTA amended to exclude from Section 230’s
protections actions to enforce “[chapter] 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of
Title 18.”
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trafficking conspiracy claims.83 FOSTA was to be the start of a new
trend. Internet immunity reform proposals now regularly spring
up to respond to the crises of the moment. With the internet having
come to dominate so much of our political and social lives,
Congress faces continuous calls to address a never-ending series of
hot-button issues: Russian interference in the 2016 election,84 the
spread of medical and political misinformation on the internet,85
biased content-moderation practices,86 and the “de-platforming” of
political speakers.87 Unlike 1995, however, internet-related
legislation must now run the gauntlet of opposition and lobbying
efforts from a fully mature tech industry.88 Congress faces
83. In its Backpage decision, the First Circuit interpreted Section 230 to immunize the
Backpage website from a sex trafficking conspiracy claim brought pursuant to the
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2017 by underage girls who
had become victims of sex trafficking and advertised for sale on the website. See Doe v.
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017), superseded
by statute, Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), Pub. L. 115164, 132 Stat. 1253, as recognized in Teatotaller, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 242 A.3d 814, 820
(N.H. 2020).
84. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Is Facebook Just a Platform? A Lawyer to the Stars Says
No, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2018, at A9 (discussing Russia’s attempt to influence the 2016 election
via social media and potential legislation from Congress that would require them to disclose
buyers of political advertising).
85. See, e.g., David McCabe, Tech Giants Shift Posture on Legal Shield, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2020, at B1 (describing apparent strategic about-face of some leaders in the tech industry
following sustained criticism for, among other things, failing to stop the spread of
misinformation online); Health Misinformation Act of 2021, S.2448, 117th Cong. (2021)
(would amend Section 230 to treat entities as publishers of health misinformation on their
platforms if their service algorithmically amplified circulation of the content during a public
health emergency).
86. See, e.g., Kate Conger & Mike Isaac, Adding Fact-Check Labels, Twitter Defies the
President, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2020, at B1 (discussing Twitter’s decision to label some of
former President Trump’s tweets as misleading and the controversy over perceived political
bias in social media platforms’ content-moderation decisions); Disincentivizing Internet
Service Censorship of Online Users and Restrictions on Speech and Expression Act
(“DISCOURSE Act”), S.2228, 117th Cong. (2021) (would amend Section 230 to eliminate
immunity where a platform moderates, modifies, or amplifies user posts).
87. See, e.g., Elizabeth Dwoskin & Crag Timberg, Dramatic Drop in Misinformation
Online Amid Bans, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2021, at A17 (discussing the policy debate
surrounding former President Trump’s suspension from Twitter and Facebook); NetChoice,
LLC v. Paxton, No. 1:21-CV-840-RP, 2021 WL 5755120, at *15 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2021)
(preliminarily enjoining enforcement of Texas HB20 law, that would prohibit online
platforms from censoring users based on the viewpoint of their speech); NetChoice, LLC v.
Moody, 546 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1094 (N.D. Fla. 2021) (barring enforcement of Florida’s SB 7072
law, which would treat social media platforms like common carriers and require them to
host user speech of all viewpoints).
88. Facebook’s lobbying expenditures have risen dramatically, from a mere $200,000
and two lobbyists as recently as 2009, to $20 million and 72 lobbyists in 2021. See Meta
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tremendous pressure to act, but, apart from sex trafficking, no issue
has held the staying power or built the momentum necessary to
produce even minor change, let alone comprehensive reform.
3. Legislating in the Abstract
There is also a more fundamental obstacle to internet immunity
reform: Congress’s legislative infrastructure is poorly suited to
address the sorts of disruptive technologies that increasingly
demand its attention. The traditional legislative process is
principally reactive. When a new problem arises, Congress
responds by collecting data, deliberating to identify available
options and form a consensus, and, finally, by attempting to craft
an optimal, forward-looking rule to govern future instances of
that problem.89 Congress’s response to Backpage.com is a good
example. An apparent hole in sex trafficking civil remedies arose,
and Congress enacted FOSTA to target the problem.90 This
approach to lawmaking ably governs future instances of wellunderstood problems, but it is less effective in environments of rapid
and unpredictable change, where new problems may arise, only to be
replaced by still newer ones before Congress can effectively respond.91
In a sense, of course, none of this is new. Lawmakers have long
recognized that times change and that laws enacted to address one
set of circumstances may eventually be called upon to govern a

Lobbying
Profile,
OPENSECRETS
(2021),
https://www.opensecrets.org/federallobbying/clients/summary?cycle=2021&id=D000033563. Facebook and Amazon are now
the top corporate spenders on political lobbying in the United States. See Ilya Banares,
Facebook and Amazon Unleash Spending, Vault Atop U.S. Lobbying, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 24, 2021),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-24/facebook-amazon-edge-outother-corporate-giants-in-lobby-spend; see also Tom Jackman, Tech Companies Push Back as
Congress Tries to Fight Online Sex Trafficking, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/09/18/tech-companiespush-back-as-congress-tries-to-fight-online-sex-trafficking/ (describing Google, Facebook,
and others’ opposition to the bill that eventually became FOSTA, and a letter to Congress
describing the law as “a mistake of historic proportions”).
89. See Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovationfrom Facts to Data, 57 JURIMETRICS J. 169, 170–73 (2017) (discussing the traditional ex post
rulemaking process and the challenge it faces when regulating rapidly evolving technology).
90. See Pub. L. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018).
91. See Kaal & Vermeulen, supra note 89, at 173 (observing that in an environment of
rapidly evolving innovation, “by the time legal issues are addressed, new and different legal
issues are created”).
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much different future.92 To account for this, legislation can be
drafted broadly, to cover future as well as existing technologies or
to require a specified standard of care regardless of circumstances.
For example, when New York City established the Taxi &
Limousine Commission in 1971, it established regulations to
govern not Checker A11 taxicabs specifically, but any “motor
vehicle, yellow in color, bearing a Medallion indicating that it is
licensed . . . to carry up to five passengers for hire.”93 So drafted,
preferences for improved fuel economy, the rise of the Honda
Civic, and even electric motors posed no problem. The rule
continued as it always had. But this approach has its limitations.
Who, in 1971, could have imagined the internet, pocket-sized
smartphone computers, and ridesharing apps that would one day
throw the industry into chaos?94 Lawmakers do their best to
imagine the future and legislate at an appropriate level of
abstraction. But sometimes the future brings unforeseeable shifts in
technology, consumer behavior, or industry practices that render
well-intentioned legislation ineffective or even harmful. Section 230
itself is a good example: a statute designed for ISPs and content
distributors on the publication-centric internet of 1996 now
struggles to govern the smartphone apps and online services of the
modern virtual world.95
Given the pace of technological change and the difficulty of
predicting—let alone legislating for—future innovation, it is no
surprise that Congress has been cautious. Crafting abstract
legislation to govern a world one has never seen is fraught with
danger. In the current political climate, and with the fear of
enacting legislation that only makes matters worse, it is no surprise
that Congress has been unable to build the consensus required for
comprehensive reform.

92. See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 3 (2014) (collecting and discussing the “significant literature on statutory ‘obsolescence,’
dating to the 1920s”).
93. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., RULES, Tit. 35, § 51-03 (Am. Legal Publ’g through Jan. 22, 2022).
94. See Mike Isaac, Uber Hires Ex-Adviser to Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2014, at B1
(discussing the state of regulatory confusion that followed the introduction of the Uber and
Lyft ridesharing transportation services).
95. See supra Section I.B; see also Dickinson, supra note 51, at 360–72 (detailing the shifts
in internet technology that have undermined Section 230).
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III. THE INTERNET IMMUNITY ESCAPE HATCH
Despite widespread dissatisfaction with the current internet
immunity regime,96 Congress has thus far made little progress
toward change. The polarized political climate makes Section 230
reform feel like a zero-sum game, where to compromise is to lose.97
And even where agreement might be possible, drafting legislation
poses a special challenge because quickly evolving internet
communications technologies force legislators to craft abstract
legislation to govern an unseen future.98
But, by now, political stalemate and rapid technological change
have become regular obstacles to governance,99 for which familiar
solutions are available—most commonly, congressional delegation
of regulatory authority to an administrative agency.100 This Part
explores the political and practical feasibility of administrative
governance in this area, and concludes that an administrative
solution would suit the problem but that congressional action to
authorize rulemaking is unlikely in the short term, and ultimately
proposes a second-best, interim approach: that the current text of
Section 230 be leveraged for reform through judicial
reinterpretation of the statute’s outdated, but helpfully sparse,
immunity provisions.
A. Delegation and Compromise
The most common solution to the problems of congressional
deadlock and technological change is for Congress to delegate its
policy-making authority to an administrative agency. This
approach offers several advantages over the traditional legislative
process that make it an attractive option for internet immunity
96. See supra Sections I.B, II.A.
97. See supra Section II.B.1.
98. See supra Sections II.B.2–3.
99. See Freeman, supra note 92, at 2–3, 17–18 (discussing how ideological polarization
impedes Congress’s ability and willingness to respond to emerging technological
developments); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1441, 1444–49 (2008) (explaining that, in addition to the Constitution’s bicameralism
and presentment requirements, House and Senate procedural rules create numerous
“vetogates” at which opponents of legislation can kill a bill and that “[t]he obvious
consequence of the vetogates structure is that federal statutes are hard to enact”).
100. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1189 (1986); David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the
Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947 (1999); Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002).
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reform. First, delegating authority to an administrative agency
allows the law to evolve in response to changing circumstances.101
Congress can enact broad directives authorizing administrative
rulemaking and then rely on the agency to handle whatever more
detailed regulations and policy making are required. The
advantage is this: unlike legislation, administrative delegation
requires only that Congress muster a majority sufficient to legislate
at one single point in time. If Congress can overcome the
constitutional and procedural barriers to legislation even one time,
and enact a broad legislative skeleton, that skeleton can then be
fleshed out and updated by successive generations of future
regulators, even at times when Congress itself could not form a
sufficiently powerful majority to legislate.
Delegation also allows Congress to take advantage of agencies’
expertise.102 Legislators tend to be well-educated, with 94% of
House Members and 100% of Senators in the current Congress
holding at least a bachelor’s degree, but far fewer hold advanced
degrees.103 Of those who do, the majority are lawyers, not experts
in any field of technical or scientific knowledge.104 As society
becomes more complex and technical, so too do its laws. Although
legislators are broadly educated and responsive to their
constituents’ priorities and viewpoints, they may not have the
specialized knowledge, or the time, to design the detailed
regulatory structures on which modern society depends. By
legislating broad policy goals and assigning the task of detailed
101. See Eskridge, supra note 99, at 1453–55 (observing that the numerous vetogates
impeding legislative change make it difficult to repeal or modify statutes, that “statutes
[legislators] enact have got to last a long time—often indefinitely[,]” and that agency
delegations provide a mechanism for adapting law to new circumstances).
102. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1617
(2016); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89
GEO. L.J. 97 (2000); David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the
Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 962 (1999); Cass R.
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987); see also Barry
Sullivan & Christine Kexel Chabot, The Science of Administrative Change, 52 CONN. L. REV. 1
(2020) (discussing administrative expertise as a traditional rationale for delegation and
reviewing literature raising objections to reliance on such expertise as a justification for the
full breadth of the modern administrative state); Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the
Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377, 1406 (2017) (identifying agency expertise as “one of the
bedrock rationales” for congressional delegation to agencies and its relationship to agencies’
drafting assistance to Congress).
103. Membership of the 117th Congress: A Profile, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (Feb. 22, 2022),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46705.
104. See id.
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rulemaking to administrative experts, both Congress and agencies
work within their relative strengths.
Finally, delegation to an agency for rulemaking makes
congressional compromise easier. Sometimes competing factions in
Congress agree on broad principles—for example, “to protect the
public health”105—but are unable to agree on a specific legislative
strategy to accomplish those goals. In such instances, agency
delegation offers an attractive avenue for compromise: Congress
can enact legislation that affirms a set of core, agreed-upon policy
goals; leave intentionally unresolved the particulars on which
Congress was unable to agree; and delegate the responsibility for
specific rulemaking on unsettled matters to an administrative
agency.106 By shifting rulemaking on controversial matters to
agency decision makers, Congress not only sidesteps the timeconsuming (or impossible) give-and-take process of legislative
compromise, but it is also insulates itself from any political
fallout.107 Should whatever regulatory structure emerges prove
unpopular, Congress can just blame the agency.108
105. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (authorizing the Environmental Protection
Agency to set such national air quality standards as are “requisite to protect the public
health”); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001) (holding that
the statutory directive contained a sufficiently intelligible principle and rejecting challenge
that regulations issued pursuant to the directive were invalid for improper delegation of
legislative authority by Congress).
106. See Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron
Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1542–43 (2009)
(explaining that in the interest of compromise, interest groups and sympathetic legislators
leave some issues undecided and delegate their resolution to agencies); Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 647, 666–67 (1992) (observing that statutes have become increasingly complex, that
congressional consensus has become more difficult to achieve, and that to find compromise,
“[c]ongress has adopted . . . the strategy of passing increasingly broad and amorphous
enabling legislation that delegates controversial matters to administrative agencies”); see also
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540 (1983) (“Almost all
statutes are compromises, and the cornerstone of many a compromise is the decision, usually
unexpressed, to leave certain issues unresolved.”).
107. See Nicholas Almendares, Blame-Shifting, Judicial Review, and Public Welfare, 27 J.L.
& POL. 239 (2012) (discussing the blame-shifting phenomenon and defending its usefulness
against the criticism that delegation may encourage Congress to act contrary to the public
interest); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 568 (2009) (noting that
delegation allows congress to avoid blame for controversial choices while also claiming
credit for taking broad action to address the problem); Macey & Miller, supra note 106, at 666;
see also Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition,
66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 555 (1972).
108. Supporters of broad delegation note that although delegation to an agency may
partially protect legislators from blame, legislators are still accountable to voters for their
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These features point to internet immunity law as an appropriate
target for administrative rulemaking. The internet and related
technologies are highly complex and notorious for fast-paced
change. And although there is agreement among legislators on
basic principles—that free expression on the internet should be
protected and that online wrongdoing should be punished—they
have not been able to agree on a specific legislative approach.
Delegation to an administrative agency would seem to be the
natural solution. Congress could build a consensus at a high level
of generality around a set of core principles, with those legislators
most focused on internet wrongdoing ceding ground to those most
concerned with free expression, and vice versa, and then draft an
enabling statute that identifies and authorizes an agency to pursue
those broadly stated policy objectives.
Unfortunately, apt as it may be, even the agency-delegation
option does not appear likely to overcome congressional deadlock
on the internet-immunity issue. Congress has made no move
toward either detailed legislation or a broad-brush enabling statute
that would authorize administrative rulemaking. And those
numerous bills that have been proposed would tweak existing
language, not overhaul the statute. Section 230 is poised to remain
the law of the land for some time.
B. The Stopgap Delegation That Already Is
Because internet technology changes rapidly and a
congressional majority has been difficult to muster, one solution to
the internet immunity question would be for Congress to enact
high-level, future-proof legislation at whatever level of generality
consensus is possible. It could then rely on agency rulemaking or
judicial elaboration to apply Congress’s broad statutory directives
to particular cases and adapt the law to technological change. As
discussed previously, however, congressional deadlock and
political polarization have prevented legislative efforts. In the short
term, neither legislation to reform Section 230 nor to delegate
administrative rulemaking authority is likely. But hope is not lost.
As this section will show, even though no fresh legislation from
decision to delegate, and agencies are themselves accountable to the president. See Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 100, at 1721, 1748–50; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 315, 323 (2000). The extent to which delegation insulates legislators from blame for
regulator policy choices is a debated question. For a recent discussion of the issue, see David
Schoenbrod, Statutory Junk, 66 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2023, 2029 (2017).
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Congress is forthcoming, significant reform is possible through an
unlikely source: the Section 230 internet immunity statute already
on the books.
Forget, for a moment, the decades of judicial precedent that
created the internet immunity doctrine that we now know. Instead,
look at the simple words adopted by Congress in 1996: “No
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”109
Section 230(c)(1)110 is famously short—a mere twenty-six
words.111 Adding the rest of subsection (c) brings the count to 132,
and even the entire section comes in under 1,000 words, at 981. By
contrast, President Trump’s May 2020 executive order interpreting
subsection (c) is more than double that length.112 The provision is
barely an ink blot compared to behemoth congressional enactments
governing other major issues such as atomic energy,113 interstate
transportation,114 and corporate financial reporting.115
Not only is the provision short, but its language addresses
internet immunity at an extraordinarily high level of generality—
perhaps the only level that would have made sense in 1996, when
the virtual world we know today was just coming into existence.116
109. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
110. Section 230’s key provision is subsection (c), paragraph (1), the provision invoked
by defendants in almost all internet immunity cases. Paragraph (2) of that subsection
provides a specific, “Good Samaritan” defense to entities that voluntarily censor
objectionable material against claims that by censoring they assume liability for content not
censored. Subsections (a) and (b) identify the background findings and policies that
Congress intended the statute to promote, subsection (d) requires internet service providers
to notify users that parental controls are commercially available, and subsections (e) and (f)
define the statute’s terms and interaction with other state and federal laws. See 47 U.S.C. § 230.
111. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). In his “biography” of Section 230, The Twenty-Six Words That
Created the Internet, Jeff Kosseff memorably recounts how these few, unassuming words
tucked into the Communications Decency Act came to govern and, indeed, create the modern
internet. See KOSSEFF, supra note 3, at 1–8.
112. See Preventing Online Censorship, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079–83 (May 28, 2020).
113. See Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 83–703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.) (43 pages).
114. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–88, 109 Stat. 803 (codified in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (157 pages).
115. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.) (66 pages).
116. See Dickinson, supra note 51, at 367–72 (discussing the dramatic evolution of the
internet in the decades since Section 230 was enacted, particularly its expansion beyond the
publication-centric, mass-media-like entities of the 1990s to the complete virtual world that
we have today).
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The statute applies to any “interactive computer service,” which it
defines as anything that involves multiple computer users
communicating.117 It makes no distinction between smartphone
apps and websites, between online publications and social media
sites, between content distributors and sellers of goods and
services, or even between internet service providers and the
websites whose data they relay. If an entity is online, it is an
interactive computer service, and a single rule applies: It may not
be held responsible for others’ information.118
That is it. That one, twenty-six-word rule along with the
Section’s all-encompassing definitions are the text by which
Congress created internet immunity law. How could Congress
have packed so much into so little? The answer, of course, is that it
did not, at least not directly. Twitter-powered insurrections119 and
Backpage-aided sex trafficking120 were decades away, and
Congress gave them no thought at all. Instead, it legislated its
vision for the future internet with broad brushstrokes that, despite
their imprecision, ensured the protection of those principles so
central to the modern internet. The law promotes freedom of
expression by guaranteeing online entities’ ability to relay the
massive volume of data that flows through systems without
incurring liability for others’ content.121 And the law helped to
protect a then-nascent internet (and continues to support the
117. More precisely, Section 230 defines “interactive computer service” to mean “any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or
educational institutions.” 47 U.S.C § 230(f)(2).
118. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). There are nuances, of course. As mentioned earlier,
§ 230(c)(2) includes a provision to specifically immunize online entities that make efforts to
censor objectionable material to ensure they do not thereby become liable. And § 230(e)
enumerates a few specific instances in which online entities are ineligible for immunity, such
as violations of intellectual property rights or sex-trafficking laws.
119. See Cecilia Kang, Democrats, In Control, Plan Push Against Tech, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2021, at B1 (describing Democrats’ “animus toward digital platforms” as having various
motivations, including “that Facebook, Twitter and YouTube allowed President Donald J.
Trump and far-right groups to spread disinformation about the election that led to the riot.”).
120. See John Anderson, Investigating the Online Enablers of Child Sex-Trafficking, WASH.
POST, May 21, 2017, at E7 (discussing the problem of online sex trafficking via Backpage and
industry opposition to efforts to amend Section 230 to exclude sex-trafficking claims).
121. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (providing that an “interactive computer service shall
[not] be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another”); see
also id. at § 230(a) (announcing the finding of Congress that “the Internet . . . “offer[s] a forum
for a true diversity of political discourse” and that “[i]ncreasingly Americans are relying on
interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.”).
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current vibrant tech industry) by protecting online entities from
lawsuits that would hold them responsible for others’ actions or for
their good-faith attempts to filter harmful or offensive material.122
The statute affirms those core values on which legislators then and
now agree—but at a level of generality that necessarily delegated
nuanced elaboration to future decision makers. In short, Section 230
is very much like the enabling statute Congress might enact today.
Section 230’s broad language also contains the seeds for reform.
Decades of judicial precedent have cemented in place an expansive
view of immunity that has spurred calls for change. But the same
statutory language could have produced very different results.
Postponing, for now, discussion of how decades of judicial
precedent could be set aside,123 the sections that follow show how
Section 230’s indeterminacy makes it flexible enough to address
those areas of internet immunity law that have been the focus of
calls for reform: online wrongdoing, disparate treatment of online
versus offline entities, content-moderation practices, and perceived
censorship bias.
1. Addressing Volitional Wrongdoing
As discussed previously,124 the courts’ prevailing interpretation
of Section 230 faces criticism for protecting online wrongdoers.
Because the doctrine includes no mental state limitations on
immunity, an entity is eligible for immunity even if it is aware of or
intends to cause harm.
But this result does not flow necessarily from the text. As Justice
Thomas recently explained,125 looking to the legal backdrop against
which Section 230 was enacted points to a different, much narrower

122. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (barring liability predicated on “any action voluntarily
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the [online entity]
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable”); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(a), (b) (announcing findings and policies of Congress
that “[t]he rapidly developing array” of online services “represent[s] an extraordinary
advance in the availability of educational and informational resources,” that such services
“have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans,” and that “[i]t is the policy of the United
States” “to promote the continued development of the Internet” and “to preserve the vibrant
and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services”).
123. This important question is taken up infra Section III.C.
124. See supra Sections I.B, II.A.
125. See Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 14–15
(2020) (Statement of Thomas, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
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understanding of internet immunity. Traditional defamation law
distinguishes between publishers, like newspapers and book
publishers, and distributors, like newsstands and bookstores. On
one hand, newspapers and other publishers can be liable for
defamatory material they print and circulate—even if it is written
by third-party authors—because as publishers they promote and
exercise editorial control over the material.126 Mere distributors,
like newsstands, on the other hand, generally cannot be liable for
defamatory content in the materials they distribute.127 But this rule
is subject to one important exception: a distributor can be held
liable for defamation if the distributor knew or had reason to know
that the content was defamatory.128
Why does any of this matter? Take another look at Section 230.
The statute provides that an online entity shall not “be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another . . . .”129 One plausible alternative130 interpretation of that
126. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577 (1977) (stating the general rule regarding
publication or republication of defamatory material, under which both the original speaker
or publisher and any subsequent party who repeats or republishes the material can be liable);
see also DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 520 (2d ed. 2015) (explaining defamation
law’s broad concept of publication, which means “any communication, by any method, to
one or more persons” and naturally includes books and newspapers “if distributed to at least
one person besides the plaintiff”).
127. See Malwarebytes, 141 S. Ct. at 14 (discussing this aspect of pre-internet defamation
law in the context of Section 230).
128. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581 (1977) (providing that “one who only
delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third person is subject to liability if,
but only if, he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character.”); see also DOBBS ET
AL., supra note 126, at § 522 (explaining that in contrast to newspapers, distributors are
“essentially a conduit, not an originator or promoter of content” and that “liability cannot be
imposed unless the distributor knows or should know of the defamatory content in the
materials he distributes”).
129. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added).
130. This is far from the only possible alternative interpretation of the provision. The
provision could, for example, be interpreted even more narrowly, as a definitional clause,
which would leave in place only § 230(c)(2)’s Good Samaritan immunity. See Doe v. GTE
Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (Easterbrook, J.) (proposing this reading in dicta). One
important effect of interpreting subsection (c)(1) as a mere definitional clause is that it would
leave the scope of publisher and distributor liability as a question of state tort law rather than
federal statutory law. Another possibility, initially raised in the Ninth Circuit’s influential
decision in Roommates.com, would narrow immunity by defining content creators to include
any website that is even partly “responsible for” content authored by one of its users. See
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th
Cir. 2008). This is an imperfect solution, however, because not all volitional wrongdoing on
the internet is related to content authorship. See Dickinson, supra note 51, at 120–32. Also,
despite the theoretical scope of this interpretation, courts after Roommates.com have
continued to apply immunity broadly, requiring plaintiffs to show an entity’s material
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language131 would read as (1) a determination by Congress that
internet service providers and other online entities who do not
author content are mere distributors, not publishers; 132 and (2) an
affirmation of the common-law rule that bars defamation actions
against mere conduits, that is, distributors, unless they have actual
or constructive knowledge of the unlawful material.133
Interpreted this way, the statute could account for some of the
concerns that are animating the push for Section 230 reform. The
law would continue to protect internet service providers and
platforms that unknowingly transmit or host unlawful third-party
content (think Verizon, Google Cloud Storage, and Facebook), but
would allow claims to proceed against entities like Backpage134 that
intentionally or knowingly host unlawful material. Merely
contribution by “specifically encourag[ing] development of what is offensive about the
content” before an entity can be found to have created or developed content. FTC v.
Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009); see Malwarebytes, 141 S. Ct. at 16
(Statement of Thomas, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (noting that courts have
narrowly construed content creation “to cover only substantial or material edits
and additions”).
131. The leading interpretation of § 230(c)(1) is, of course, that of Zeran v. America
Online, which rejected any distinction between publisher and distributor liability on two
grounds. First, Zeran noted that a contrary holding would risk indirect censorship of internet
users’ speech via the heckler’s veto. Second, Zeran reasoned that because it requires an
underlying defamation claim, of which publication is a necessary element, distributor
liability is merely a subset of publisher liability, and Section 230’s reference treatment of
online entities as “publishers” should not be read as distinct from treatment of them as
“distributors.” See 129 F.3d 327, 331–33 (4th Cir. 1997).
132. This interpretation is even more plausible when one considers the circumstances
surrounding its enactment. When Congress enacted Section 230, it had firmly in mind the
then-recent decision Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., in which a New York state
trial court held an internet service provider liable for defamatory content posted by a third
party on one of the service’s message boards. See No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. May 24, 1995). Stratton Oakmont had reasoned that because Prodigy took steps to review
and screen offensive content, it had taken on the role of a newspaper-like publisher rather
than a mere distributor and could therefore be held liable for repeating the defamer’s words.
Section 230 rejects that result. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (“One of the specific purposes
of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy . . . .”).
133. See Malwarebytes, 141 S. Ct. at 14–15 (after discussing historical defamation law,
concluding this to be the “face value” interpretation of Section 230); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc.,
783 So. 2d 1010, 1019–28 (Fla. 2001) (Lewis, J., dissenting) (urging this interpretation while
dissenting from the 4–3 majority in an early Section 230 decision); see also JOHN C.P.
GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS 319–39 (2020) (adopting a
similar interpretation of Section 230(c) after analyzing Section 230’s interaction with preinternet defamation law, common law rules regarding voluntary bystander invention, and
state law initiatives to enact Good Samaritan statutes designed to protect intervenors from
tort liability).
134. See supra Section I.B (discussing the allegations against Backpage and the First
Circuit’s decision granting Section 230 immunity).
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adopting a different interpretation of Section 230, rather than
enacting any new statutory language at all, could accomplish many
of the objectives of the EARN IT Act,135 the See Something, Say
Something Act,136 the Department of Justice’s proposed Section 230
reforms,137 and other proposed reforms targeted to address
intentional or knowing facilitation of internet wrongdoing.138
There is, of course, a reason early courts interpreted Section 230
differently. Led by the Fourth Circuit’s now-famous decision in
Zeran v. America Online,139 courts around the country were
concerned that free expression would suffer unless they granted
broad Section 230 immunity, even to entities with actual
knowledge of unlawful content. They feared what is known as the
heckler’s veto problem: If platforms become liable for any content
they are made aware of but fail to take down, platforms might
decide to automatically take down, without investigation, any
content simply reported to them as objectionable to avoid the cost
of investigating.140 An internet user’s post might be taken down and
her freedom to speak her mind undermined by the unverified
complaint of an internet “heckler.” To avoid this problem and
thereby further a policy of “freedom of speech in the new and
burgeoning Internet medium,” early courts granted broad
immunity under Section 230 to any claim implicating an entity’s
“exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as

135. Eliminating Abusive and Rampant Neglect of Interactive Technologies Act of
2020, S.3398, 116th Cong. (2020).
136. See Something, Say Something Online Act of 2020, S.4758, 116th Cong. (2020).
137. DOJ SECTION 230 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 53, at 14–18.
138. See supra Section II.A (discussing these and other proposed reforms).
139. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
140. See generally Brett G. Johnson, The Heckler’s Veto: Using First Amendment Theory and
Jurisprudence to Understand Current Audience Reactions Against Controversial Speech, 21 COMM.
L. & POL’Y 175 (2016) (discussing the concept of the heckler’s veto, whereby an individual is
able to restrict another’s freedom to speak by filing complaints against, shouting down,
heckling, threatening, or otherwise harassing the speaker); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 880 (1997) (invalidating portions of the Communications Decency Act, because, among
other reasons, the requirement not to communicate indecent speech to “specific persons”
“would confer broad powers of censorship, in the form of a ‘heckler’s veto,’ upon any
opponent of indecent speech”); Rory Lancman, Protecting Speech from Private Abridgement:
Introducing the Tort of Suppression, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 223, 253–55 (1996) (discussing the origin
of the “heckler’s veto” concept).
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deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content”
even when that entity is made aware that the content is unlawful.141
This is a very real concern. Changes to internet immunity
doctrine could have significant consequences for the tech industry
and free expression online. Narrowing Section 230 immunity
would expose online entities to increased legal risk and could
undermine free expression by driving entities to curtail third-party
speech on their platforms or even eliminate it altogether.
Compliance costs and litigation expenses could bog down the tech
industry and even threaten the United States’ long-standing
position as a worldwide technology leader.
Any reform to Section 230 must be undertaken cautiously, and
solutions must be carefully tailored to avoid undermining the broader
goals of the statute. In another article I present my own preferred
(and extremely narrow) proposal for internet immunity reform.142
Here my aim is different. Rather than press for any particular
approach, this Article engages in a thought experiment to explore how
broad reform may be possible even within the confines of the
existing statute.
Interpreting Section 230(c)(1) afresh, courts could, for example,
interpret the provision to bar only claims against unknowing
hosting or transmission of unlawful content and to permit claims
predicated on knowledge or intent. Subsequent judicial elaboration
could then balance the numerous competing concerns that underlie
the reform debate, such as victims’ interest in civil recourse, the
public’s interest in robust online discourse and protection from the
heckler’s veto, and the tech industry’s concern that the law not
impose on it burdensome litigation costs or an unreasonable
obligation to review user complaints regarding content. Courts
might decide, for example, that entities with knowledge are not
immune, but that an entity’s receipt of one complaint in a sea of
other complaints is not sufficient to confer actual or constructive
knowledge. Or that true knowledge of unlawful material only
occurs once a content author concedes the content to be unlawful.
Or when the platform admits content’s unlawfulness and
undertakes to remove it. The possibilities seem endless, and that is

141. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330, 333 (reasoning that even “liability upon notice reinforces
service providers’ incentives to restrict speech” because the entity would be required to
review and investigate so many complaints as to “create an impossible burden”).
142. See Dickinson, supra note 51.
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the point. Section 230—as it already exists—is sufficiently flexible
to serve as the mechanism for reform.
2. Disparate Treatment of Online and Offline Entities
Another problem with current internet immunity doctrine is its
application outside the publication context, which has created a
disparity in the law’s treatment of online and offline entities.
Although Section 230 is publication-centric—it encourages
censorship and it speaks in terms of “publishers or speakers” and
“content providers”—publication has never been the internet’s
exclusive function, and it is even less so now than it was in 1996.143
The internet operates as a virtual world, complete with all manner
of goods and services and every kind of wrongdoing. That includes
not only publication-related wrongs, like defamation, but also
physical-world wrongs, like designing defective smartphone apps
or engaging in false advertising or unfair competition.144
When online entities engage in these types of wrongdoing,
claims asserted against them raise categorically different issues
than Section 230 or the internet immunity doctrine it inspired are
designed to handle. Rather than argue that an online entity should
be responsible for failing to review or moderate third-party content,
such claims are analogous to physical-world product defect,145

143. See Dickinson, supra note 51, at 114–25.
144. See supra Section I.B (discussing these and other examples).
145. See, e.g., Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (analyzing a
negligence claim against Snapchat for alleged defects in design of the speed filter feature of
its app, which plaintiff alleged contributed to auto accidents). A Georgia state trial court held
similarly in Maynard v. McGee, No. 16-SV-89, 2017 WL 384288, at *3 (Ga. State Ct. Jan. 20,
2017) (finding Snapchat immune under Section 230, reasoning that the Snapchat user, not
Snapchat, created the content at issue). But see Maynard v. Snapchat, Inc., 816 S.E.2d 77, 79–
82 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (reversing the lower court and declining to extend immunity on
grounds that the case did not depend on publication of third-party content); Maynard v.
Snapchat, Inc., No. A20A1218, 2020 WL 6375424, at *3–4 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2020)
(following failed Section 230 defense and remand, affirming dismissal for lack of duty of
product manufacturer to protect against third-party misuses of product).
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negligence,146 or unfair competition claims.147 They argue that an
online entity should have designed its app or website differently,
typically to include more safety features, or that it engaged in
anticompetitive business practices.
Despite the diversity of online wrongdoing, however, current
internet immunity doctrine is still predicated on a bright-line rule
designed for the more publication-centric internet of 1996: Content
creators may be sued, but online entities that use that content
are immune. This content-authorship-based test for immunity
becomes problematic in cases where a plaintiff’s injury is causally
connected to third-party-created content, but the defendant’s
alleged wrongdoing is not based on a failure to moderate that
content.148 Even for claims related to product defects or unfair
competition that do not allege a failure to review third-party
content—and thus do not implicate the moderation burden and
heckler’s veto concern—courts often grant immunity to defendants
on the ground that to do otherwise would interfere with the entity’s
control over “traditional editorial functions.”149 This expansive

146. See, e.g., Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710, 716 (Wis. 2019) (analyzing
negligence, public nuisance, wrongful death, aiding and abetting tortious conduct, and other
claims against Armslist, alleging that it intentionally designed its website to facilitate illegal
gun sales); Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2016) (analyzing a statutory
sex-trafficking conspiracy claim against Backpage based on actions the site allegedly took to
impede law enforcement efforts, such as email anonymization and stripping metadata from
photographs), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017), superseded by statute, Allow States and Victims
to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), Pub. L. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253, as recognized in
Teatotaller, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 242 A.3d 814, 820 (N.H. 2020).
147. See, e.g., Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 700 F. App’x 588, 590 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming
dismissal of unfair competition claim alleging Facebook violated its own terms of service to
the plaintiff’s detriment by failing to block obscene videos of the plaintiff posted to the
service by an unknown person); Marshall’s Locksmith Service Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d
1263, 1265–66, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of the Lanham Act false advertising
claims of locksmith companies, which alleged that Google and other online advertising
platforms had “conspired to ‘flood the market’ of online search results with information
about so-called ‘scam’ locksmiths, in order to extract additional advertising revenue” from
truly local locksmiths).
148. See Dickinson, supra note 51 at 125–34 (elaborating on this point and discussing its
impact on claims involving volitional wrongdoing, online marketplaces, and
defective products).
149. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); see Malwarebytes, Inc.
v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 16–18 (2020) (discussing the breadth of
protection over entities editorial decisions and courts’ application of immunity in
nonpublication contexts). Courts have applied Zeran’s protection of “traditional editorial
functions” even though applying the doctrine to bar product-defect and other
nonpublication claims is in tension with Section 230’s publication focus and the logic of Zeran
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application of Section 230 immunity creates a rift between the law
applicable to online versus offline entities by barring some victims
from seeking recovery merely because the defendant happens to
operate online.150
Of course, when it comes to dissemination of online content,
that is exactly what Congress intended—to insulate the burgeoning
world of internet media from overburdensome regulation.151 But
disparate treatment has cropped up even outside the informationdistribution context. Courts have interpreted Section 230 to act as a
broad defense to any cause of action at all—whether it be
defamation,
negligence,
housing
discrimination,
unfair
competition, securities fraud, or anything else—in which the
defendant’s dissemination of third-party-created content is even
tangentially related to the plaintiff’s injury.152 Application of
Section 230 immunity to all actions, even outside the publication
context, has created dissonance between the law of online and
itself, which premised protection of editorial functions despite a culpable mental state on the
need to avoid the heckler’s veto.
150. See supra Section I.B; see also Dickinson, supra note 51, at 114–34.
151. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (expressing the “policy of the United States” to “promote the
continued development of the Internet . . . and other interactive media” and “preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet . . . unfettered by
Federal or State regulation”).
152. See Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting that “[t]he
broad construction accorded to section 230 as a whole has resulted in a capacious conception
of what it means to treat a website operator as [a] publisher or speaker” and that Section 230
has accordingly been applied to “a wide variety of causes of action, including housing
discrimination, negligence, and securities fraud and cyberstalking”) (citations omitted), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017), superseded by statute, Allow States and Victims to Fight Online
Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), Pub. L. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253, as recognized in Teatotaller, LLC
v. Facebook, Inc., 242 A.3d 814, 820 (N.H. 2020); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096,
1101–02 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hat matters is not the name of the cause of action—defamation
versus negligence versus intentional infliction of emotional distress—what matters is
whether the cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the
‘publisher or speaker’ . . . . To put it another way, courts must ask whether the duty that the
plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a
‘publisher or speaker.’ If it does, section 230(c)(1) precludes liability.”). But see Doe v. Internet
Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2016) (allowing a failure to warn claim to proceed
over the assertion of Section 230 defense because although plaintiff’s publication of her
online profile on the Model Mayhem website was part of the string of causation that led to
her sexual assault, the plaintiff’s claim that the website failed to warn her about sexual
predators on the site did not seek to hold website liable as the publisher or speaker); City of
Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010) (Section 230 “does not create an
‘immunity’ of any kind. It limits who may be called the publisher of information that appears
online. That might matter to liability for defamation, obscenity, or copyright infringement.
But Chicago’s amusement tax does not depend on who ‘publishes’ any information or is a
‘speaker.’ Section 230(c) is irrelevant.”) (citation omitted).
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offline entities. That is because, with one important exception,153
Section 230 is not a major deviation from the common-law
defamation principles that apply to physical-world entities; it does
not create a rift in defamation liability for online and offline
publishers.154 Section 230 does, however, mark a major departure
from prior law when it is applied to nonpublication claims.
Historically, non-authorship of content was not a defense to nonpublication claims such as product liability or unfair competition
claims. By giving online entities, but not offline entities, a new
defense to nonpublication claims, Section 230 created a rift between
online and offline entities.
As with volitional wrongdoing,155 however, the statutory text is
amenable to a different reading. Section 230(c)(1) provides that no
“interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by [a third party].”156 Although
historically it has been read broadly, this language could be read
much more narrowly, to apply only to publication-related claims
like defamation.157 Indeed, a few courts have done exactly that and
declined to apply Section 230 to causes of action for which
publication is not a required element.158 Agency rulemaking or

153. The exception is the treatment under Section 230 of entities with actual or
constructive knowledge of defamatory content. Print media entities subject to common-law
defamation rules are subject to liability for content they know or should know to be
defamatory, whereas under the prevailing interpretation of § 230(c)(1), online entities are
immune regardless of knowledge. See supra Section II.B.1.
154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. f (1965) (“One who . . . transmits
a written message for another is not liable for the defamatory character of the message unless
he knows or has reason to know that the message is libelous.”); see also Brent Skorup &
Jennifer Huddleston, The Erosion of Publisher Liability in American Law, Section 230, and the
Future of Online Curation, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 635, 638–46 (2020) (detailing the evolution of
defamation liability for publishers and distributers in the twentieth century from strict
liability to a fault-based regime which includes a conduit liability defense and requires
knowledge or recklessness because of the impossible burden of moderating mass media).
155. See supra Section III.B.1.
156. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added).
157. It could even be read as a definitional clause that creates no immunity at all and
instead merely gives context to § 230(c)(2)’s Good Samaritan immunity provision. See Doe v.
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (proposing this reading in dicta); see also Shlomo
Klapper, Section 230 Textualism, 70 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (defending this
interpretation on textualist grounds). But see Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for C.R. Under L.,
Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, J.) (declining to adopt
this reading when presented with the opportunity to do so).
158. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010)
(reasoning that Section 230 “limits who may be called the publisher of information that
appears online,” which “might matter to liability for defamation, obscenity, or copyright
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judicial elaboration interpreting Section 230 to apply only to
publication-related actions would eliminate the disparity in
treatment between online and offline entities.
However, identifying those claims related enough to
publication to warrant immunity could prove difficult. Creative
plaintiffs would attempt to plead around Section 230 by dressing
up what is really a defamation claim as something different. For
example, a plaintiff might claim that a defendant platform acted
negligently by failing to identify and remove repeat posters of
unlawful content from its platform.159 Or that it tortiously
interfered with a contract or prospective business relationship by
failing to remove untruthful statements about the plaintiff.160 Or
that it became part of a cyberbullying conspiracy when it failed to
intervene despite notice from concerned parents.161 Courts would
need to develop detailed rules to prevent creative lawyers from
pleading around the Section 230 defense.
A superior approach, in my view, would be to interpret Section
230(c)(1)’s reference to actions that treat online entities as a
infringement” but not “Chicago’s amusement tax”); Airbnb, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of San
Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (concluding that Section 230 did not
preempt city ordinance that criminalized Airbnb’s collection of fees for providing booking
services for unregistered short-term residential rental units). Given courts’ broad conception
of what editorial functions Section 230 protects, however, this requirement is almost always
satisfied. See Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting that “[t]he
broad construction accorded to section 230 as a whole has resulted in a capacious conception
of what it means to treat a website operator as [a] publisher or speaker” and that Section 230
has accordingly been applied to “a wide variety of causes of action, including housing
discrimination, negligence, and securities fraud and cyberstalking”) (citations omitted), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017), superseded by statute, Allow States and Victims to Fight Online
Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), Pub. L. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253, as recognized in Teatotaller, LLC
v. Facebook, Inc., 242 A.3d 814, 820 (N.H. 2020). But see Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d
846, 853 (9th Cir. 2016) (allowing failure to warn claim to proceed).
159. Cf., e.g., Doe v. Twitter, Inc., No. 21-cv-00485-JCS, 2021 WL 3675207, at *32 (N.D.
Cal. 2021) (negligence claims against Twitter for failing to remove unlawful videos after
notice); Nunes v. Twitter, Inc., 105 Va. Cir. 230 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2020) (plaintiff alleging Twitter
liable for negligence “for allowing the defamatory content to remain on [its]
internet platform”).
160. See, e.g., Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., No. 2:04CV462FTM29SPC, 2006
WL 66724, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2006) (alleging tortious interference with business
relationship where web host failed to take down website); see also Page v. Oath Inc., No. 79,
2022 WL 164008, at *3 & n.31 (Del. 2022) (discussing plaintiff’s claim before the trial court,
but not pursued on appeal, that defendants tortiously interfered with prospective business
relationships by hosting allegedly defamatory articles on their websites).
161. Cf., e.g., Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871, 907 (9th Cir. 2021) (conspiracy claim
against online platforms under Anti-Terrorism Act for providing material support to
terrorist organization); Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 72 (2d Cir. 2019) (same).

1473

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:5 (2022)

“publisher or speaker”162 of third-party content to mean those
actions that would impose on entities a duty to review and
moderate third-party-created content.163 Like limiting Section 230
to publication-related claims, this approach would align the law’s
treatment of online and offline entities by allowing claims to
proceed unless they implicate the content-moderation burden that
Section 230 was designed to shield against. But because the
definition would focus on the effects claims have on entities rather
than the claims’ names or elements, the boundary would be easier
for rule makers to define.
3. Encouraging Content Moderation
Section 230 has also faced criticism for protecting online
platforms that disseminate harmful or offensive material. The
prevailing view interprets the statute to immunize online entities
against any claim related to “information provided by [a
third party].”164 The defense applies no matter the type of
information at issue, be it hate speech, election misinformation,
revenge porn, cyber bullying, or anything else.165 And an entity is
eligible for immunity even if it knows the content is on its platform
and still fails to remove it.166
Again, however, the statute could be read very differently.
Recall the discussion earlier regarding the pre–Section 230 common

162. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
163. See generally Dickinson, supra note 51, at 134–51 (proposing congressional
amendment to Section 230(c)(1) that would produce the same result).
164. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
165. See supra Section I.B.
166. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (interpreting
Section 230 to bar even “liability upon notice”); see also Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma
Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 15 (2020) (explaining that courts have interpreted
Section 230 to confer immunity “even when a company distributes content that it knows is
illegal”); Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 21–24 (1st Cir. 2016) (dismissing claim
despite allegations website acted deliberately because “[w]hatever Backpage’s motivations,
those motivations do not alter the fact that the complaint premises liability on . . . third-party
content”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017), superseded by statute, Allow States and Victims to
Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), Pub. L. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253, as recognized in
Teatotaller, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 242 A.3d 814, 820 (N.H. 2020); Barnes v. Yahoo, 570 F.3d
1096, 1098–103 (9th Cir. 2009) (dismissing negligence claim where defendant Yahoo
acknowledged nude photos posted of plaintiff without her consent but promised to follow
through on its promise to remove them); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1018 (Fla.
2001) (dismissing claim where plaintiff alleged AOL was aware that a particular user of its
service was transmitting unlawful photographs and yet declined to intervene).
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law.167 Historically, the law distinguished between publishers, like
newspapers, and distributors, like newsstands, and held that
whereas publishers could always be liable for circulating
defamatory third-party speech, distributors could be liable only if
they knew or should have known the speech to be defamatory.168
In light of this historical distinction, one possible interpretation of
Section 230(c)(1) is that it designates online entities as distributors,
not publishers, thereby protecting them from liability for thirdparty content they distribute, but only if they do not have
knowledge of its unlawfulness.169
Judicial elaboration could expand this idea of actual or
constructive knowledge beyond its common-law boundaries170 to
include the concept of negligent or willful blindness. For example,
knowledge of unlawful content could be defined to include lack of
knowledge due to failure to include content-flagging mechanisms
by which a platform’s users can submit content for review. Or it
could include lack of knowledge for failure to timely review and
respond to user-flagged content. Knowledge imputation could
even be limited to certain categories of material, thereby allowing
courts to impose a moderation requirement for only the very most
harmful types of content.171 With Section 230(c)(1) immunity
167. See supra Section III.B.1.
168. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (1977) (providing that “one who only
delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third person is subject to liability if,
but only if, he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character”).
169. See supra Section III.B.1.
170. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 (1965) (explaining that as used in the
Restatement, “reason to know” denotes “the fact that the actor has information from which
a person of reasonable intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor would infer
that the fact in question exists, or that such person would govern his conduct upon the
assumption that such fact exists”); see also Knowledge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019) (defining constructive knowledge as “[k]nowledge that one using reasonable care or
diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law to a given person”).
171. Whether aimed at curtailing online entities’ volitional wrongdoing, see supra
Section II.B.1, or at encouraging more robust content-moderation efforts, judicial exploration
of what constitutes sufficient “knowledge” of unlawful content within the meaning of
Section 230 to trigger distributor liability would parallel judicial efforts in the context of
copyright law to determine what constitutes an online entity’s “red flag” awareness of
copyright infringement so as to take the entity outside of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act’s (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1301), safe
harbor provisions for online service providers. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (providing safe harbor
immunity from copyright infringement claims to online service providers when certain
conditions are satisfied, including that they are “not aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent”). In that context, courts have converged around a
standard requiring knowledge of specific files or activity, not mere generalized knowledge
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narrowed to apply only where an entity lacks knowledge, and
knowledge expanded to include failure to adopt sufficiently robust
moderation practices, the statute would allow state and federal
regulators to adopt rules banning online entities’ transmission or
hosting of disfavored material, right up to the boundaries of the
First Amendment.172
Whether any of this is a good idea is a separate question.
Indeed, in my view,173 such changes would do far more harm than
good. Exposing online entities to notice-based legal liability would
impose an enormous content-moderation burden that would
undermine free expression. Platforms could be compelled to
heavily censor user speech or disallow online posting altogether to
avoid the risk of liability. But the idea of exposing online entities to
limited, knowledge-based liability for at least certain types of
wrongdoing has proponents in Congress and some public support.
The point here, rather than to reiterate my own views of policy, is
to show what could be accomplished within the confines of the
existing statute. Section 230’s effect on content-moderation
practices could be dramatically altered with no amendment at all
to the statute’s text.
4. Preserving Internet Free Expression
Noting that Section 230 was intended, in part, to protect the
internet as “a forum for a true diversity of political discourse,”174
some critics have challenged the availability of internet immunity
even to entities whose content-moderation practices may be
politically biased or disfavor marginalized voices.175 As courts have
interpreted it, Section 230(c)(1) is available to any online entity as a
defense to claims predicated on third-party-created content,

of misuse for infringement, as the level of knowledge that will remove an entity from the
protection of DMCA’s safe harbor. See Capitol Recs., LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 93 (2d
Cir. 2016); Ventura Content, Ltd. v. Motherless, Inc., 885 F.3d 597, 609–10 (9th Cir. 2018); BWP
Media USA, Inc. v. Clarity Digital Group, LLC, 820 F.3d 1175, 1182 (10th Cir. 2016).
172. For a discussion of the different procedural and substantive scope of Section 230
compared to the First Amendment, see Goldman, supra note 11, at 36–46.
173. See Dickinson, supra note 51, at 114–20, 134–51 (discussing the importance of
Section 230 to prevent online entities from facing an overwhelming burden to moderate
content, the need to protect free expression against collateral censorship, and proposing
reforms to Section 230 centered around those goals).
174. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3).
175. See supra Sections I.B, II.A.
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whether it engages in neutral content moderation, biased content
moderation, or no content moderation at all.176
This feature of Section 230 doctrine, too, could be reformed by
reinterpreting the existing statute.177 As discussed in the previous
section, Section 230(c)(1) could be interpreted to protect online
entities from liability for third-party content only where they lack
knowledge of the content’s unlawfulness.178 Knowledge could be
interpreted to include negligent or willful blindness, including
failure to adopt robust content-moderation procedures. Such
mandated procedures might include a requirement that platforms
publish detailed content-moderation policies to notify the public
what types of content they permit.
Next, with all online entities compelled to issue detailed,
content-moderation policies, further judicial rulemaking could
interpret Section 230’s reference to “publisher or speaker”
liability179 not to protect online entities against non-publication
claims,180 including false advertising or breach of contract for
failure to abide by their stated moderation policies.181 This two-step
approach would force platforms to carefully articulate their policies
and make them available for public inspection and criticism.
176. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see also Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003)
(observing that Section 230 “makes ISPs indifferent to the content of information they host
or transmit: whether they do (subsection (c)(2)) or do not (subsection (c)(1)) take precautions,
there is no liability under either state or federal law”).
177. The same or similar reforms could also be accomplished by judicial or legislative
determination that social-media platforms should be treated as common carriers and
required transmit by all users equally, regardless of its viewpoint. See Biden v. Knight First
Amendment Institute at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1221 (2021) (Thomas, J. concurring
in denial of petition as moot) (suggesting that given social-media platforms’ market
dominance and prominent role in modern discourse perhaps they should be treated as
common carriers). But see Gregory M. Dickinson, Big Tech’s Tightening Grip on Internet Speech,
54 IND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (suggesting competitive market forces be given more time
to operate before any such drastic intervention).
178. See supra Section III.B.3.
179. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
180. See supra Section II.B.2.
181. Current internet immunity doctrine bars such claims. See Marshall’s Locksmith
Serv., Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1265–66, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal
of locksmith companies’ false advertising claims, which alleged that Google and other online
advertising platforms had “conspired to ‘flood the market’ of online search results with
information about so-called ‘scam’ locksmiths, in order to extract additional advertising
revenue” from truly local locksmiths); Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 700 F. App’x 588, 590 (9th
Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of unfair competition claim alleging Facebook violated its
own terms of service to plaintiff’s detriment by failing to block obscene videos of plaintiff
posted to the service by an unknown person).
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Should an entity fail to abide by its stated policies, an aggrieved
user would have recourse in the courts by asserting a claim for false
advertising or breach of contract.
This is the riskiest proposal of all. Unless courts were to grant
online entities significant deference on their moderation decisions,
the requirement could pressure online entities to adopt strict,
bright-line content moderation policies, increase litigation costs,
and press platforms toward heavy-handed censorship to avoid
legal liability. The result could very well be less, not more, freedom
of expression for online speakers. Dangerous as such reforms may
be, however, the point of this Article is to demonstrate what is
possible. As with other reform proposals, judicial elaboration on
the current text could achieve the objectives of the very bills
pending in Congress,182 all without changing a word of Section 230.
C. Parrying Path Dependency
Now it is time to take up the crucial question previously
deferred183: Who cares if Section 230 could be interpreted
differently? What really matters is how it has been interpreted.
Courts adopted an extremely broad approach to immunity in the
internet’s early days. Does not that precedent now bind us to the
status quo? The answer, as this section will explain, is no. Even
without new congressional action, Section 230’s extreme breadth
leaves state and federal courts ample room to break free from the
existing body of case law and chart a new course.
The traditional process for statutory reform in the courts is the
gradual, common-law-like narrowing and distinguishing of past
decisions. However, the extremely broad language of courts’ early
Section 230 precedents make that approach difficult in this
context.184 The prevailing interpretation, for example, allows for no
182. For discussion of pending proposals, see supra Section II.A.
183. See supra Section III.B.
184. Several factors contributed to the law’s development toward its current state. First,
the seminal Section 230 cases were decided in the early years of the internet and, like the
statute itself, designed for an online world very different from today’s. Smartphones, social
media platforms, and even much of the online commercial activity that is now so familiar
were still years away, and the early cases necessarily made no distinction between those
technologies and the more traditional internet providers and media outlets prevalent on the
internet of the 1990s. See Dickinson, supra note 51, at 367–72 (discussing the internet’s
evolution from the 1990s to today). Second, courts were concerned to protect the nascent
internet from legal liability that could threaten its growth and undermine what was then a
burgeoning new medium for free expression. This included protecting them even against
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mental-state-based limitation on immunity for entities that have
knowledge of unlawful material on their platforms.185 And the only
basis on which the defense permits liability to be imposed is for
authorship of content, even though not all internet wrongdoing
involves content creation.186
The most promising direction for precedential evolution is the
small body of case law that has attempted to limit the Section 230
defense to publication-related claims. So limiting Section 230 would
allow product liability, unfair competition, negligence, and other
claims to proceed, while still protecting online entities from claims
related to publication of third-party content.187 In practice,
however, it has been difficult for courts to identify and enforce the
border between claims that are sufficiently related to publication to
trigger immunity and those that are not. A hard rule barring
defamation claims, for example, just presses litigants to
recharacterize their claims and plead them as other causes of action.
But courts could develop more nuanced tests to catch such pleadarounds, while allowing true nonpublication claims to proceed. For
example, as discussed previously,188 courts might revise the
publication-related inquiry189 to ask whether the plaintiff’s theory
of relief would require the online entity to review and moderate
third-party content to prevent the alleged harm. Regardless of any

claims that alleged actual knowledge of unlawful content. For entities that transmit large
quantities of third-party-created content, the threat of notice-based legal liability could push
them to heavily censor content rather than undertake the cost and risk of careful pruning.
See supra Section III.B.1; Gregory M. Dickinson, Toward Textual Internet Immunity, 33 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 1, 6–7 (2022) (discussing Zeran and early courts’ concern to protect against the
“heckler’s veto” problem). Third, this was the approach adopted by Zeran, the first federal
appellate court to interpret Section 230. The decision was authored by the widely respected
Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson III, who provided a thorough analysis of the statute’s underlying
purposes and concluded that broad immunity would best serve those ends. Given the
natural tendency of courts to follow carefully reasoned precedents and to harmonize the law
among the federal circuits, other jurisdictions quickly, and largely uncritically, followed the
Fourth Circuit’s lead. See Klapper, supra note 157, at Section I (discussing the historical
genesis of current Section 230 doctrine).
185. See supra Sections I.B, II.A.
186. See supra Sections I.B, III.B.1–2.
187. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010)
(Easterbrook, J.) (reasoning that Section 230 “limits who may be called the publisher of
information that appears online,” which “might matter to liability for defamation, obscenity,
or copyright infringement” but not “Chicago’s amusement tax”).
188. See supra Section III.2.
189. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (protecting online entities against claims that treat them
as “publisher or speaker” of third-party-created content).
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new test adopted, however, case law evolution of Section 230’s
publication-related limitation can only go so far.190 It might align
the law’s treatment of online and offline entities, and it might
partially address volitional wrongdoing, but reforming platforms’
content-moderation practices would require a different approach.
For more significant reform, the United States Supreme Court
is the obvious candidate. Despite numerous opportunities in recent
years,191 the Court has never issued a decision interpreting Section
230. But that may soon change. Last term the Supreme Court again
declined to interpret Section 230 when it denied a request to review
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Malwarebytes v. Enigma.192 Although
he agreed with his colleagues’ decision not to hear the case, Justice
Thomas took the unusual step of issuing a statement to explain
why, “in an appropriate case,” the Supreme Court should take up
a Section 230 case to consider the appropriate scope of internet
immunity.193 If the Court were to interpret Section 230, it would be
190. The limited power of lower courts to shape, but not wholly undo, existing Section
230 doctrine is a good thing—a feature of our legal system, not a bug. Were jurisdictions
across the country suddenly to adopt radically different approaches from one another to
internet intermediary liability, online entities (which often operate in numerous
jurisdictions) would face significantly increased legal uncertainty and compliance costs,
which they might well pass on to their users. Users of legal services, for their part, would
face increased costs for services and uncertainty of their own legal rights. See Dickinson,
supra note 51, at 386–87, 392–94 (discussing the costs to online entities of legal uncertainty
and rejecting on that basis a multistate approach to intermediary liability reform).
191. See, e.g., Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
2761 (2020); Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710 (Wis. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 562
(2019); Hassell v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Hassell v. Yelp, Inc., 139
S. Ct. 940 (2019); Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
622 (2017), superseded by statute, Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act
(FOSTA), Pub. L. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253, as recognized in Teatotaller, LLC v. Facebook, Inc.,
242 A.3d 814, 820 (N.H. 2020).
192. See Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13 (2020).
193. See id. (Statement of Thomas, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). Other signals
also suggest the Supreme Court is considering wading into the internet-law debate.
Following Malwarebytes, in May 2022, Justice Thomas authored an opinion supporting the
Court’s denial of certiorari for lack of finality for an action against Facebook by an underage
girl trafficked for sex, but again suggesting that consideration of Section 230’s scope may be
warranted: “As I have explained, the arguments in favor of broad immunity under § 230 rest
largely on ‘policy and purpose,’ not on the statute’s plain text. Here, the Texas Supreme
Court recognized that ‘[t]he United States Supreme Court—or better yet, Congress—may
soon resolve the burgeoning debate about whether the federal courts have thus far correctly
interpreted section 230.’ Assuming Congress does not step in to clarify § 230’s scope, we
should do so in an appropriate case.” Doe v. Facebook, Inc., 142 S. Ct. 1087, 1088 (2022)
(Statement of Thomas, J. respecting denial of certiorari) (internal citations omitted).
Similarly, last year the Court took up Biden v. Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia
University, 141 S. Ct. 1220 (2021), a case that challenged former President Trump’s decision
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writing on a completely blank slate. It could affirm the prevailing
interpretation found in existing case law, adjust that case law where
it perceives past courts to have gone astray, or completely upend
the past cases and take internet immunity doctrine in an entirely
new direction, including reforms to platforms’ content-moderation
practices or any of the other possibilities discussed above.194
Another path to reform is through those state high courts
around the country that have not yet interpreted Section 230.
Because the Supreme Court has never interpreted the statute, the
question of its scope has been left for independent resolution in
sixty-three jurisdictions—the thirteen federal circuit courts of
appeal and the high courts of the fifty states.195 Thus far, those
courts have coalesced around the extremely broad internet
immunity doctrine that is now the target of reform efforts. But with

to block certain users from responding to his tweets. The Court ultimately dismissed the
challenge as moot after Trump’s election loss, but here too Justice Thomas took the
opportunity to comment on the legal challenges surrounding online speech and social media
sites. See id. at 1221 (Thomas, J. concurring). The Supreme Court is rightly cautious when it
reshapes laws of such great national significance, often preferring targeted, narrow opinions,
but it has shown itself willing to upend even core legal doctrines if it deems them sufficiently
misguided or harmful to society. See, e.g., Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1652
(2021) (interpreting “exceeds authorized access” under Computer Fraud and Abuse Act not
to include defendant’s use of database for an improper purpose); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910 (2014) (rejecting Federal Circuit’s test for whether a patent
claim is “definite,” reasoning that it would create “powerful incentives to inject ambiguity”
into claims); Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 925 (2014)
(rejecting Federal Circuit doctrine permitting liability for indirect patent infringement even
in the absence of direct infringement).
194. See supra Sections III.B.1–4.
195. Although state courts are bound by the Supreme Court on matters of federal law,
they are not required to follow decisions of the federal courts of appeal. Compare James v.
City of Boise, 136 S. Ct. 685, 686 (2016) (per curiam) (reversing Idaho Supreme Court decision
that it was not bound to follow the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a federal statute and
explaining that it is the Supreme “Court’s responsibility to say what a federal statute means”
and “it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding”), with Owsley v. Peyton,
352 F.2d 804, 805 (5th Cir. 1965) (“Though state courts may for policy reasons follow the
decisions of the Court of Appeals whose circuit includes their state, they are not obliged to
do so.”) (citation omitted). See also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“[N]either federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires
that a state court’s interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court’s
interpretation.”); Arizonans for Off. English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66 n.21 (1997) (noting
that “the stare decisis effect of [a federal district] court’s ruling was distinctly limited”
because it was “not binding on the Arizona state courts”). For an intriguing alternative view
that state courts should be bound by lower federal courts’ interpretations of federal law, see
Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent on
the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53 (2015).
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momentum growing for change, those jurisdictions196 that have not
yet interpreted Section 230 could consider alternatives to the
prevailing view to address current doctrine’s perceived flaws. By
doing so, those courts could exert pressure on other courts to
reconsider prior decisions or even spur the Supreme Court to action
to resolve inconsistencies between jurisdictions.
Finally, recent actions by Congress and the Supreme Court have
cast doubt on the prevailing interpretation of Section 230 and in
doing so have opened a potential path to reform even for those
courts that are precedentially committed to current internet
immunity doctrine. In his statement accompanying denial of
certiorari in Malwarebytes, Justice Thomas lamented that lower
courts “have long emphasized nontextual arguments when
interpreting § 230, leaving questionable precedent in their wake.”197
In particular, he questioned courts’ application of Section 230
immunity in many of the same contexts that have drawn
Congress’s attention: platforms that leave content on their sites that
they know to be unlawful; those that seek out and curate unlawful
content for their sites; and claims outside the publishing context,
such as those related to defective products.198 Sensing a gap
between Congress’s words and current internet immunity doctrine,
Justice Thomas urged the Court in a future case to consider whether
“the text of [Section 230] aligns with the current state of immunity
enjoyed by Internet platforms.”199

196. The high courts of thirty-four states have never interpreted Section 230: Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West
Virginia, and Wyoming.
197. Malwarebytes, 141 S. Ct. at 14.
198. See id. at 15–18; see also supra Sections I.B–II.A (discussing problems with current
internet immunity doctrine and various proposals for reform under consideration
by Congress).
199. Malwarebytes, 141 S. Ct. at 14.
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Congress noted similar concerns when it enacted FOSTA200 in
2018 in response to the First Circuit’s Backpage.com201 decision.202
With FOSTA, Congress sent a strong message to the nation’s courts
that they have been misapplying Section 230. In its report
recommending that FOSTA be enacted into law, the House
Committee on the Judiciary lamented that “[i]n civil litigation, badactor websites have been able to successfully invoke [Section 230]
despite engaging in actions that go far beyond publisher
functions.”203 And throughout the legislative process,
representatives from across the political spectrum took the
opportunity to criticize the courts’ overzealous application of
Section 230 immunity. Indeed, when introducing the bill, Senator
Portman who coauthored FOSTA and who also voted to enact the
Section 230 of the CDA in 1995 explained that although “I believe
that the Communications Decency Act is a well-intentioned law
that has an important purpose. . . . the law was not intended to
protect those who willingly facilitate illegal conduct, such as sex
trafficking[.]”204 When it amended Section 230 to specifically
exclude sex-trafficking claims, Congress “clarif[ied] that section
200. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), Pub. L.
115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018).
201. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 622
(2017), superseded by statute, Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act
(FOSTA), Pub. L. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253, as recognized in Teatotaller, LLC v. Facebook, Inc.,
242 A.3d 814, 820 (N.H. 2020).
202. See supra Sections I.B, III.B.1 (discussing the Backpage decision and the FOSTA
amendment to Section 230).
203. H.R. REP. NO. 115-572, Part 1, at 4 (2018) (citing Backpage.com and apparently
disagreeing with that court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit treated the site as a
publisher or speaker within the meaning of Section 230); accord S. REP. NO. 115-199, at 2 (2018)
(Section 230’s “protections have been held by courts to shield from civil liability . . . nefarious
actors, such as the website Backpage.com.”).
204. 163 CONG. REC. S4670–71 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2017) (noting that even though the
Backpage.com court “found that the victims made a strong case that backpage [sic] tailored its
site to make underage sex trafficking easier,” it found it immune “no matter how complicit
the website was”); accord 164 CONG. REC. S1853 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2018) (statement of Sen.
Heitkamp, D-North Dakota, who sponsored FOSTA) (“I never believed that the [CDA]
protected [Backpage.com] from . . . civil penalty if they were complicit and, in fact, abetted
these crimes. I never believed that, but there were judges in America who did.”) (emphasis
added); 164 CONG. REC. H1277 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2018) (statement of Rep. Collins, R-Georgia,
who supported FOSTA) (“[S]ome websites have successfully invoked the section 230
immunity provision despite engaging in actions that venture far outside the scope of those
envisioned by the statute . . . Doe v. Backpage . . . held that . . . this law shielded the company
from the claims that were filed by the child victims. . . . FOSTA is a recommitment to
Americans that Congress never intended to create a system that allows business to commit
crimes online that they could not commit offline.”).
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230 . . . does not prohibit the enforcement against providers . . . of
interactive computer services of . . . civil law relating to . . . sex
trafficking”205 and announced “the sense of Congress that . . .
section 230 . . . was never intended to provide legal protection to
[such] websites[.]”206
FOSTA and Justice Thomas’s statement in Malewarebytes are
signals to the nation’s courts that it may be time to revisit longstanding case law on Section 230. The world has changed since
courts’ early decisions. The internet is now the dominant forum in
which Americans voice their political views; it has transformed into
a complete virtual world for the sale of goods and services; and it is
now populated with all the bad actors and harms of the real world.207
These developments have broken down the bright-line rules and
tidy categories of early cases and forced courts to address a more
nuanced world while tied to sweeping precedents that they might
decide differently today.208
But the courts have the power to change course. State high
courts or, less likely, en banc reconsideration by the United States
Federal Courts of Appeal could quickly wipe the slate clean and
give the judiciary a fresh opportunity to interpret Section 230 in
light of the last twenty years of internet history. Courts could add
distinctions and nuance to existing bright-line rules to address
volitional wrongdoing and disparate treatment of online versus
offline entities.209 Or, taking a bolder approach, they could apply
Section 230 to address content-moderation and censorship-bias
concerns surrounding online expression.210 The path to reform is
open—no amendment required.
CONCLUSION
Although Section 230 continues to play a critical role regulating
internet liability, the law is insufficiently nuanced to govern the
broad spectrum of entities that populate the modern internet.
Congress is deadlocked and unable to act, but an alternative,
perhaps superior, path to reform is available through the very
205. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (FOSTA),
Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253.
206. Id. at § 2(1).
207. See Dickinson, supra note 51, at 120–34.
208. See id. at 120–25.
209. See supra Sections III.B.1–2.
210. See supra Sections III.B.3–4.
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statute already on the books. Because of its extreme breadth and
linguistic indeterminacy, Section 230 acts as a broad delegation of
interpretive authority to the judiciary, which now holds the power
to achieve the very reforms on which Congress has been unable to
act: intentional online wrongdoing, disparate treatment of online
versus offline entities, harmful internet content, and biased
censorship practices. This Article lays the foundation for courts to
press forward with reforms by reading Section 230 afresh,
illuminated by the last twenty years of internet history.
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